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Bank failures happen when the institutions are not able to fulfill their obligations, requiring the 
intervention of the regulator. These failures have a strong negative effect on the economic and 
financial systems, this is the reason why investors and supervisors created different models to 
control the institutions.  
One of the biggest reasons why the bank failures have this negative consequence is the 
contagion effect; the default of these institutions is damaging because it spreads through the 
banking system leading other banks to fall insolvent.  
Banking system is hence strongly regulated, banks need to satisfy prudential requirements 
either nationally or internationally decided but sometimes the regulations are not efficient and 
lead to counterproductive behavior (increase of the probability of failures and increasing the 
costs connected to them).  
The failures of the banking system are driven by different factors: high presence of Non-
Performing Loans on banks’ balance sheets, distortive managerial incentives that lead to take a 
high level of risk, issuance of loans to individuals which are not creditworthy (i.e. low FICO 
score) are some of them. Both internal and external causes are fundamental to understand why 
banks can fail and why some of them are weaker than others.   
There are different tools to analyze if a bank is healthy or not, the main distinction between 
these methodologies is on-site and off-site.  
Under FDICIA (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act) of 1991 new 
rules have been set for the on-site examinations. At least once a year (once every 18 months for 
small and sound institutions), the regulators should visit the offices of the bank to conduct an 
on-site analysis. It is an expensive analysis in terms of time and money and it cannot be 
frequently conducted, often offering old and not updated data.   
Nevertheless, as soon as they are conducted, on-site examinations are highly accurate and allow 
to deeply understand if the bank needs to change something in its operations and if tighter 
requirements are needed. It also allows to examine the quality of managers’ work which is else 
difficult to estimate.  
One of the most common used on-site examination in the U.S. is the CAMELS (Capital, Assets, 
Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity) which gives as output a composite rating 
for the institution that goes from 1 (sound bank) to 5 (failing bank). The regulator imposes 
tighter regulations for the banks rated 3, 4, and 5.  
 Off-site analysis is mainly based on data publicly available (financial statements and 
regulatory reports). The results from the analysis are less accurate than the ones the regulator 
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retrieves from the on-site examinations but they give a better understanding of what it is 
happening to the bank in the period of time between the on-site analyses; indeed, the frequency 
of supervision is more frequent.  
 U.S. government implemented different models for the off-site analysis: the Uniform Bank 
Surveillance Screen, CAEL System, SCOR System and SEER. All these systems mainly use 
statistical techniques to evaluate the banks’ conditions.  
The costs associated with the off-site monitoring tools are lower if compared to the on-site 
analyses and usually these analyses also are less time consuming.  
 This work is based on the analysis of different types of off-site examinations to understand 
how accurate they can be to predict the failure of U.S. large commercial banks. The predictors 
used for this research are all retrieved from the FDIC database for the period of time that goes 
from 2005 to 2015; the ratios have been selected on the basis of their relevance in predicting 
the failure of the banks.   
Both statistical and machine learning techniques are used in order to evaluate in a more precise 
way which is the best model to predict the failure of the banks.  
In particular the statistical techniques that are implemented are Logistic Regression and Linear 
Discriminant Analysis.  
Machine learning algorithms learn from the data which are given as input. Support Vector 
Machines, k-Nearest Neighbors, Random Forest, and Backpropagation Neural Network are the 
methods implemented.  
 Type I and Type II errors and other measures for the accuracy and prediction ability are to 
define which method can be more reliable as an off-site examination tool.  
 Once the best off-site tool is found between the ones implemented, it is used to verify how 
the prediction power behaves as the time from failure increases (up until 8 quarters prior to 
failure).    
 The work is presented as follows: Chapter 1 is focused on the analysis of the reasons of the 
bank failures, including a section on the importance of the prediction of the failure. In Chapter 
2 on-site and off-site analyses are showed and compared. Different off-site examinations are 
presented to understand the strengthen and weaknesses point of each of them. Chapter 3 focuses 
on the different statistical and supervised machine learning approaches, highlighting their 
mechanisms and their ability of prediction through the examination of some literature. Chapter 
4 presents the empirical analysis: the tools explained in Chapter 3 are implemented in order to 
compare them and understand which of the tools is a better in predicting the failure of the 
analyzed banks.  
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1.  REASONS OF BANKING FAILURE 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss some of the most important causes that affect the 
stability of the banking system and lead some banks to insolvency. In a world in which the 
resources of an economy are fully-employed, the bankruptcy of the bank comes from the 
misallocation of these resources (Meyer, 1970); the authorities need to adopt measures in order 
to minimize the risk of failure and also to increase the policies to avoid the misallocation of the 
assets. From a social point of view, a voluntary liquidation or any action focused in removing 
the losses at an early date, are always preferable to a banking failure. In this chapter there will 
be an analysis of some of the major reasons that lead commercial banks to fail.  
 The crises of the banking system become worse when the macroeconomic environment is 
weak (low GDP growth) and when the inflation is high. Moreover, they are a frequently studied 
topic because they can damage the functioning of the payment system and lead to a lack of 
confidence in the domestic banks. The regulators of each country should implement some well-
designed regulations to decrease the fragility of their banking system. Nevertheless, these rules 
can have several drawbacks which are not easy to forecast or which cannot be deleted 
(Detragiache, 1998). Moreover, the operations that the governments implement in order to save 
the banking system can also have the effect of weaken the managerial incentives and force 
healthy banks to bear the losses. Policies that prevent the event of systemic banking problems 
are hence necessary. There are different events that can cause fragility in the banking system 
such as: loss of foreign exchange reserves, high interest rates, low output growth and decline in 
stock prices.  
The weak macroeconomic environment is not the only cause that lead to financial instability, 
other elements will be analyzed in this chapter.   
 One of the biggest problems regarding the banking system is the contagion effect; the 
linkages between different banks determine an interconnection that can be an issue during 
period of financial crisis.  The contagion effect can be defined as the transmission of the 
idiosyncratic risk (Hasman, 2013) that firstly affects one bank of a group of banks and then is 
transferred to other institutions in the economic sector. It is used to describe the spillover of the 
effect of a shock from one or more firms to other (Kaufman, 1994). The banking crises 
underlined how the banking sector can amplify the troubles and how interconnected are these 
financial institutions.  
 Since the contagion seems to be a relevant exposure, some prudential regulations are needed 
either in the form of capital and/or liquidity requirements which allow banks to be more 
resistant to shocks on the market conditions. Sometimes the regulations that require adequate 
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levels of capitalization and/or liquidity create some perverse incentives that need to be fixed in 
order for the whole mechanism to work smoothly.  
The linkages among some of the institutions in the financial markets create concern while 
thinking about the financial contagion, the domino effect will propagate the shock borne by one 
agent to other agents (Hasman, 2013). The chain of contagion starts from a bank which is not 
able to settle the payment obligations and it propagates to other banks and institutions; this 
contagion is mainly due to the fact that the banks are interconnected and they maintain deposit 
balances in other banks to facilitate the clearing of payments under normal circumstances. 
These deposits have the characteristic of not being collateralized. At the same time, the crisis 
can be strong enough to propagate also to banks which are illiquid in that moment but they 
would be otherwise solvent. 
 The network between institutions works well also meanwhile some banks are facing troubles 
but with a bigger shock the connection can disrupt value of the entire system and spread the 
systemic risk also to the other sectors.  
This threat explains in an efficient way why the failure of one bank may be worse than a failure 
of a firm outside the banking system.   
The Section 1.1 will include some of the main reasons of the banking failure and the reasons 
why this topic is relevant, whilst in the Section 1.2 there will be an analysis of the distortions 
created by inefficient regulations.  
   
1.1 Why do banks fail? 
 
The cost of bank failure can be large and it may cause instability, this is the main motive why 
the focus should be on the events that lead to default. A first main division regarding reasons 
that can cause the failure of banks can be done between two factors: internal and external 
(Meyer, 1970). The local economy conditions and the general economy are the exogenous 
factors whilst the quality of management and the integrity of employees are the endogenous 
ones. Considering all the other conditions equal, banks established in areas with high income 
and fast growth rate are less likely to fail if compared to banks located in areas with lower rates 
of growth and a poorer economy. At the same time, also the structure of the banking system in 
the country can be a relevant factor while considering the performance of the institutions.  
One of the main factors that play an important role in the investigation of the banks’ default 
is the asymmetry of information; the banking crisis mainly arise when there is panic between 
the depositors whom believe that their bank is not safe anymore. There can be different sources 
of panic that are mainly due to a lack of information between the parties. The depositor may 
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not discern if the individual bank is solvent or not but he can observe the impact of the shock 
on the bank’s portfolio (Santonu, 2003).  
In many cases, the crises of the banking system lead the customers to either have a panic 
view or an information-based view of the situation (Hasman, 2013). The first one was largely 
described by Diamond and Dybvig; it is a situation in which there is a problem of coordination 
among the depositors which start believing that the banks’ assets are not safe anymore even if 
the view does not reflect the reality. The banks are defenseless while a run occurs and there 
aren’t enough regulations and lead them to liquidate their assets prematurely. Under normal 
conditions of financial stability, the banks estimate their monthly liquidity needs and they can 
decide to loan their excess reserves to other institutions that are facing liquidity shortage. This 
creates a certain level of credit risk between them.  
The information-based view instead focuses on the problems coming from the uncertainty 
and the asymmetry of information between the parties about the stability of the banks and the 
conditions that may provoke a run of the depositors. This kind of view (information-based) is 
important in this context because suggests that the failure of the banks can mainly come from 
two factors: from a bad management and from a macroeconomic risk.  
The investors build their own idea of the level of riskiness of the bank on the basis of their 
perception of the risk; rational investors are more cautious while evaluating the exposure of a 
bank in a context of financial crisis. They are aware of the effects that has the interconnection 
of the institutions in the system; when the creditors lose confidence they demand immediate 
payment of the existing loan and the banks may be forced to liquidate their assets too early and 
this creates the incentive on more depositors to withdraw their money creating an exacerbation 
of the original effect.  
 The failure of the banking system is a relevant topic to analyze since, as mentioned above, 
the risk of contagion in is high if compared to other sectors. The bank contagion is particularly 
delicate if the adverse shock (a default or near-default) of one bank is going to have a big impact 
on other banks and also beyond the financial system. Banks are unique and need regulations 
applicable only for them. The contagion in the banking system is a concern mainly because of 
the following causes listed by Kaufman in 1994.  
Occurs faster: in the case in which a large number of depositors simultaneously choose to 
transfer their deposits to another bank because they feel it unsafe, a run occurs. These 
phenomena are at the basis of a failure spread over the whole banking system. In order to satisfy 
the depositor who would like to withdraw all their money, the banks generally have to sell some 
assets in a quickly way and/or borrow funds from other banks. The liquidity problems are hence 
likely to arise in the case of a bank run; these issues can become worse and cause insolvency if 
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the losses are large enough. In the banking system the contagion is faster since the participants 
are strictly interconnected hence, a run happening in one bank, is going to affect in a fast way 
the banks which are creditors.  
Is wider within the industry: there can be identified two types of contagion in the banking 
contest (Kaufman, 1994). The pure industry specific contagion happens whenever the 
information regarding one or more banks in the industry affect all the other firms including the 
sound banks with few characteristics in common with the failed banks than being in the same 
industry.  
The second kind of contagion happens when the characteristics that the failed and non-failed 
banks have in common are plenty and the problems that arise are due to a common aspect that 
the two banks share. The higher the similarity regarding the size, location, and the market 
served, the higher the probability that the intensity of contagion will be more severe.  
The first kind of contagion is the most unpredictable and it is what mainly allows to state that 
it is wider within the industry. Moreover, the depositors usually have less information regarding 
the health condition of their own bank; the reasons are that many small depositors stated that 
an evaluation of the banks are costly (time and money), some assets the institutions have are 
unique and don’t really have a market and if they have one, their value can rapidly change due 
to different external conditions. Hence, the depositors in many cases cannot distinguish if their 
bank is solvent or not and thus, they prefer to withdraw their money if they think it is not safer 
to keep them deposited. The process is quick because the deposits are considered a short-term 
liability for banks. At the same time the depositors can prefer to keep their money deposited 
unless there are clear evidences of weakness since it can be costly to rebuild a relationship with 
the new bank.  
 As stated before, one of the main reasons at the base of bank contagion happens after runs 
of depositors. They decide to move their money to a bank they feel to be safer or they can move 
them to currency. Usually, the higher the number of the banks that the depositors feel unsafe, 
the higher the possibility to choose to move to currency. Generally it is in the interest of other 
banks to assist institutions facing problems of liquidity (but not solvency); what they can do is 
purchasing the bank’s assets at an equilibrium price rather than fire-sale price (Kaufman, 1994). 
The problems arise when the depositors flee to currency because the deposits are not 
redistributed among banks but they are lost; this creates a reduction in the money supply and a 
disruption in the payment system. (Kaufman, 1996) 
Results in a higher number of failures: one of the main roles of the capital held by banks is 
the possibility to absorb the losses and avoid that the creditors will be affected by an eventual 
shock. It is clear that a smaller capital ratio leads to a higher possibility of default for the bank. 
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As it will be discussed later, it can happen that banks may tend to hold lower amount of capital 
since there is the insurance on deposits which creates incentives to bear more risk for the bank. 
During 1990s the level of banking failure has been high also because the legal and regulatory 
structures allowed them to increase the risk since there has been imposed a reduction on the 
geographical diversification.  
It extends beyond the banking industry adversely affecting other financial industries and 
the macroeconomy: the crises that affect the banking sector can be seen as more severe than 
the ones that involve other industries. The main reason is the role of the banks in the whole 
system; they provide financial intermediation services and an interruption of the institution can 
lead to an increase of the cost of credit to the real sector causing a credit crunch. The failure of 
banks can extend beyond their sector; a reduction in the amount of deposits and the creation of 
losses for depositors create an overall reduction in the aggregate wealth. The failure of the banks 
can also lead other banks to choose less risky projects to finance creating a reduction of loans.  
 The fragility of the banking system is not a signal that the failure rate is higher in this sector 
than in other ones. The fragility means that there is the need of more attention and regulation 
(Kaufman, 1996). The introduction of the government regulation in the U.S. are focused on the 
protection against the fragility of the banks.  
  
1.1.1 Credit Risk  
 
Usually, the assumption underlying the loans that the banks issue to the customers is the 
expectation that the borrowers will repay in the future the principal and the interest on the debt 
and thus, the borrower’s future rate of return will be sufficiently high. It is clear that the lender 
does not have the certainty that this will happen.  
Credit Risk and Credit Standard are two elements that influence the operation of the banks. 
It is difficult, and almost impossible, for the banks to forecast in advance the magnitude of a 
potential default. The asset side of the banks’ balance sheet strongly depends on the loan issued 
to the clients. To avoid or reduce the risk of failure, the banks need focus on the uncertainty of 
the repayment of the loans. To have some guarantees, the banks often ask for collaterals or 
some other form of security which are alternative to the cash repayment. The values of these 
alternative methods of payment need to be uncorrelated with the value of the project for which 
the loan has been issued and should have a stable value (not subject to strong fluctuations).  
A fall in the value of the collateral can have great impact on the stability of the banks; in the 
case in which the borrower is not able to repay and the value of the collateral is deteriorated, 
there will be a loss for the bank with a magnitude not definable a priori.   
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 The Credit Risk arises in the moment in which the borrowers are not able to secure the entire 
loan through the security standards; it substantially measures the amount of the position which 
is exposed to the risk of default (unsecured position). The main issue that emerges is the 
impossibility for the banks to secure all the loans they have in their balance sheets. Some 
authors argue that the phenomenon became even more intense with the financial liberalization 
and the worsening of the competitivity (Santonu, 2003). In order to limit the Credit Risk, the 
banks need to compute a Risk Analysis in which they estimate the attitude toward risk of their 
clients that has the drawback of being sometimes independent from the pecuniary position. The 
risk comes from the possibility of the actual rate of return on the investment to be lower than 
the expected return. Looking at the past performances it  does not always conduct to significant 
and accurate results regarding the expected interest rate.  
 Banks are required to make some provisions against the Credit Risk for example 
incorporating the amount while computing the interest rate (Risk Premium) which can be 
computed on the basis of the bank’s forecasts of number the future default which is uncertain.  
This uncertainty coming from this Risk leads banks to the necessity of follow some Credit 
Standards in order to avoid to lend to individuals that are more willing to default. Indeed, since 
the value of the banking assets can drop due to the fact that the borrower cannot repay back 
their loan, the Credit Risk can be reduced by screening the loan applicants and diversifying the 
loan portfolio by lending to borrowers that are subject to risks coming from different positions.  
The discrimination between borrowers it is not always easy; in the U.S. the banks decide if to 
issue the loan based on the FICO score which is an ex-ante observation (the project can always 
fail):  
It is hence clear that the level of the Credit Risk that the banks undertake does not always 
reflect their preferences but depends also on many endogenous and exogenous factors including 
also the managers’ behavior and the competitive structure discussed in the next paragraphs.  
 
1.1.2 Managerial incentives  
 
One of the most common cause of the banks’ decline is the poor quality of the assets that can 
lead to an erosion of the banking capital. The causes that can lead to this condition can be both 
internal and external (Clarke, 1988); in this Section there will be presented an analysis of the 
internal elements.  
The management has a fundamental role on the success of the bank performance; a poor 
management reflects into the balance sheet and into the income statement of the institution. The 
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quality of the board of directors depends mainly on their experience, capability and integrity; 
the management is responsible for the strategies that should be carried on, for the stability and 
for the profitability. The long-term health of the institutions depends on the capability of the 
managers to be involved in the bank’s affair.  
One of the issues that can lead to bank instability is uniformed or inattentive board of 
directors or managers: many failed banks have the common characteristic of having directors 
that lack the necessary banking knowledges or are not well informed regarding the situation of 
the bank. These deficiencies can also come from the fact that the management does not inform 
rapidly the board of directors. The management has many important roles within the bank and 
it should be responsible of monitoring the operations and ensuring adequate internal controls. 
Also the board of directors has plenty of relevant roles to maintain stability of the bank: it 
should guarantee that the loan policies are correctly followed, avoid any inadequacy in the 
system to ensure the compliance with the policies and in the supervision of the key bank officers 
or departments. It frequently happens that failed banks don’t have enough developed internal 
policies and control systems to guide the entire staff, this is reflected in an instable profitability. 
 There are situations in which the management and/or the board of directors are overly 
aggressive. This behavior is focused on an intense growth of the bank and it is not necessarily 
a weakness. It becomes an issue when the policies of the bank are not well established and there 
is a lack of the required control. Growth minded policies have to be sustainable if compared to 
the external environment in which the bank is working and to the capability of the management. 
 The inappropriate lending policies (liberal repayment terms or low credit standard), 
excessive loan growth with respective to the ability of management to supervise the sources of 
funding and strong reliance on the volatile liabilities and a poor choice of not sufficiently liquid 
assets as source of liquidity are some of the motives for which the banking failure can be 
considered strictly connected to the quality of the management and of the board of directors. In 
particular, if the bank does not require minimum standard to borrowers, the asset quality will 
decrease. Indeed, an over-lending (a high amount of loan if compared to the ability of 
repayment of the borrower) or an insufficient collateral required by the bank can cause a fast 
deterioration of the assets and this can lead to an instable situation for the bank.  
Other elements that have to be taken into account regarding the managerial role in the bank 
failures are the insider abuse and the fraud. The first behavior arises when the 
managers/directors, for example, make inappropriate or unauthorized transactions. Both the 
actions lead to a higher probability of failure (Clarke, 1988).  
It is important to mention that not only the management and the board of directors have a 
fundamental role while analyzing the reasons of failure. All the other employees have a big 
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impact on the institutions; their honesty determine the success of a bank (Meyer, 1970). 
Unfortunately, this factor is not observable; indeed, an objective measure of honesty and 
commitment is difficult and almost impossible to find.  
  
1.1.3 Banks concentration 
 
The level of competition in a certain market depends on the number of players that are operating 
in it. The level of concentration of banks in a market can be measured by the HHI index 
(Herfindahl-Hirschman index).  
Focusing on the specific case of the U.S., there can be found differences between two levels 
of concentration in the local market and on the regional market. The reduction of the banks 
from 1990s to 2010s did not increase the average concentration of the local banking market due 
to the antitrust policies and the DOJ regulations which denied the merger that would have led 
to too much power. At the same time, the regional concentrations during the same years 
increased.  
Competition and banking failure are somehow related and they can be inversely or directly 
correlated on the basis of different variables that regard the regulatory policies, national 
institutions, ownership structure of the bank, macroeconomic and financial condition, capital 
regulation, economic growth, level of economic development, and so on.  
The correlation between competition and banking failure have been largely studied but the 
different empirical analysis that have been conducted during these years still highlight how 
there is not possible to have a unique and general conclusion for all the cases observed and 
expected.  
Some analysis highlighted how the concentration of the banks in one area increase the risk 
of bankruptcy; the reduction in competition results in higher deposit rates, the bank profits 
going up and in general less risk for the financial institution. A highly concentrated banking 
system creates fragility; the large banks can receive some subsidies (when they are considered 
too big to fail) which can create incentives in increasing the risk. Moreover, the possibility of 
monitoring a large number of small banks is easier with respect to monitor large banks that 
have more power and can have complicated situation and more factors to look at. Additionally, 
if a bank has a larger market power, it will charge for a higher interest rate which lead to a 
greater risk.  
Tighter restrictions on the entry of new banks in the market and more severe regulations 
involve bank fragility; entry barriers bring a destabilizing effect on the banking system 
increasing the probability of a shock; the stricter regulation on the banking system lead banks 
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to decrease the diversification outside the traditional business increasing the riskiness of their 
portfolios. Countries with institutions that promote the competition are less likely to suffer from 
the systemic banking crises.  
Another point of view underlines that the risk of failure declines when the competition in 
the banking system decreases. If the deposit market is more concentrated, the banks can use 
their market power to increase the profitability; they are less interested in seeking outcomes 
with a low probability of success but with higher returns.  
Banks that can have larger positioning in the market leading to less competition can have 
the advantages of reducing the transaction costs and hence, lowering the default and increasing 
the profitability of the bank. 
With high competition the banks seem to relax their credit standards generally increasing 
the instability on the loans on their balance sheets. From the loan perspective, the rates will 
increase and the borrower profits going down (Boyd, 2005). In some countries a highly 
competitive banking sector creates a level of instability for which there is the need of more 
regulations.  
A large competition among the banks lead to more difficulties while attracting both the 
borrowers and the depositors and require interest rates on the loans which will compensate the 
credit risk  (Santonu, 2003), the banks try to retain the market share they have or to expand it.  
An increase in the competition gives the possibility to borrowers to be less dependent upon 
banks since it can be easier to get funds for the projects.  
The excessive competition can lead to some undesirable outputs from a social point of view 
such as banking failures, runs and panic (Boyd, 2005). 
Less concentrated banking systems (more competitive ones) with many banks is more prone 
to financial crises than a banking sector with few larger banks. Large banks can better diversify 
their portfolios so the banking system will be characterized by a few big banks but less fragile 
than systems with many smaller banks (Beck, 2003). Moreover, a concentrated banking system 
can boost the profits and reducing the fragility; indeed, higher profits work as a buffer against 
the shocks also reducing the incentives for banks to take excessive risks.  
Lastly, some authors argued that a concentrated market allows to monitor in an easier way 
the banks; the corporate control in such situations are less complicated and are more effective 
(Beck, 2003).  
The concentration can increase when the active banks decide to merge with or acquire other 
banks that are facing trouble. This is what happened in the U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s: 
the financial crisis led to a decrease in the number of the commercial bank present in the market; 
this number was lowered even more by the merger of non-failed banks and troubled banks, the 
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same effect can be observed analyzing the number of banks in the market after 2010. The 
Federal Reserve during the 1990s prohibited the banks to obtain more than (Detragiache, 1998) 
of the total U.S. deposits and more than 30% of the single state’s total deposits by acquiring 
other banks (Wheelock, 2011). Also the antitrust policy was preventing the merger between 
non-failed bank but it was nor regulating the acquisition of failed and neither putting any limits 
on the market concentration.  
 
1.1.4 Comparing internal and external causes  
 
Both the internal and external factors are relevant while analyzing the reasons behind the failure 
of the banks and/or the whole banking system. The banks can work in depressed conditions 
which usually come from the deterioration in the different sector of the economies.   
It is important to highlight that there are some situations in which internal and external cause 
are interconnected. If the economy is affected by some shocks it is not always true that the 
banks will have a distress; the ability of the managers can help to minimize the situations in 
which the bank is affected by external environment. At the same time, with a poor management 
the institutions will be more involved in a collapse of some sectors of the economy. The 
economic conditions are rarely the primary factor in determining the banking condition (Clarke, 
1988). If there is not a sufficiently competent management and necessary internal development, 
the banks benefit less from the improvement of the economy and suffer more from the external 
shocks. Some banks are hence more likely to fail than others.  
On the other side it is also interesting to analyze which are the factors that help the banks to 
recover from a distress period. First of all, a change in the management (if the old one was not 
able to handle the situation) plays a crucial role. Other aspects are the improvement of banking 
factors, changes in banking philosophy, improvement of the assets held and of the capitalization 
but also the improvement of the external conditions is necessary in order to improve the stability 
and the profitability.  
Focusing on the capitalization aspect, the capital works as a buffer between the operating 
losses and the insolvency; a higher level of capital allows banks to be more resistant to losses.  
The banks need to put effort in order to change internally (knowledge, philosophy, strategy) 
to see some improvement and to rehabilitate. A strong economy helps the jobs of the 
management and promote the recovery but the management and the board of directors should 
act positively to boost it.  
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1.2  How to prevent banks to fail  
 
Banks have an important strategical role mainly regarding the impact they have on many 
sectors. These institutions are more susceptible to contagion because: they tend to have low 
capital-to-assets ratio that doesn’t allow for large losses, they have low cash-to-asset ratios 
which oblige banks to sell off earning assets if they want to meet the obligation with the 
depositors and they have high demand debt and short-term debt-to -total debt ratios that can 
lead banks to sell fast the assets in order to pay the depositors who decided to withdraw their 
funds (Kaufman, 1996).  
The lending activity of the banks leads to the possibility of default risk coming from the 
event in which the borrowers cannot repay back the loan (principal and interest). Another 
exposure that the bank face is the funding one; these institutions have to borrow short-term in 
order to finance their assets (loans to customers). Moreover, as mentioned above, the systemic 
risk is another exposure that the banks face that is largely due to the lack of confidence from 
the market’s participants coming from a disruption in liquidity and/or from the decline of the 
asset price.  
To avoid or reduce all the exposures, there is the need of one or more regulators. In the U.S 
both the federal and the state governments regulate the financial markets. They work 
independently and their aim is to ensure the financial stability of the market. The main goals 
are the prevention of fraud and the maintenance of efficiency in the banking system.  
Some of the federal regulatory bodies that have been established in U.S. to maintain efficiency 
in the banking system are: the Federal Reserve Board (also responsible for the implementation 
of the monetary policy), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (mainly supervising and 
regulating charters of banks in the U.S. and responsible for ensuring the efficiency of the 
banking system), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (providing insurance for the funds 
of the depositors in the bank up to $250,000), the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (mainly regulating the futures and options) and the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority.  
 As previously mentioned, the U.S. regulatory system is dual; both the federal and the state 
are in charge of overseeing the banking system. The most important authorities at State level 
are: the State Bank Regulators (have powers and goals comparable to the OCC but at state 
level), State Insurance Regulators (mainly protect the consumers regarding the insurance on 
their deposits) and State Security Regulators.    
The U.S. federal banking agencies have the power to regulate both the banks and the bank 
holding companies which are under their jurisdiction. There is a hierarchy regarding the 
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regulation in the U.S.; the most important are the Federal statutes and legislative mandates 
which authorize the agencies to set the minimum capital requirement and the capital adequacy 
standards, the regulations and reporting requirements that establish the capital adequacy rules 
and the policy statements, interpretations and supervisory guidance and manuals (Branson, 
2014).  
 All these bodies should help the banking system to avoid fragility and be resistant to shocks 
and guarantee the fairness for the customers.  
 
1.2.1 Analysis of the regulations 
 
All the public policies regarding the banking system have to be focused on the stability of it. 
The regulators should prevent the fragility and consequently to reduce the failure rate. The 
systemic risk is an exposure that arises because the banks are interconnected and should be one 
of the main points of the banking regulations.   
One of the most important regulations to which the banks in the U.S. are subject to is the 
Basel III (Basel I and Basel II in the past years) that requires the institutions to maintain some 
capital requirements.  
Basel III is an international regulatory framework which consist in an agreement between the 
central banks and the bank supervisory authority in order to standardize the bank capital 
requirements  (Bjorksten, 2014). This regulation, approved by the U.S. in 2010, defines the 
regulatory capital and increases the capital holding requirements for banks 
 Basel I was fully implemented in the U.S. in 1992 and the regulatory framework was 
including the following major requirements. Tier 1 capital component composed by common 
shareholder’s equity, disclosed reserves, retained earnings, and preferred stocks. The banks 
should have had at least the minimum required Tier 1 capital risk-weighted asset ratios (Tier 1 
capital divided by bank assets weighted according to their likelihood of default). Tier 2 capital 
includes set aside for expected loan losses and the allowances for loan and lease losses; these 
allowances are adjusted quarterly and the reserves for loan losses have to come from the 
earnings. When the allowances are higher than 1.25% of the total risk weighted assets, the 
excess is not counted as Tier 2 capital. Basel I also provided an obligation of conducting a stress 
test in order to define whether the bank is able to be not highly affected by losses coming from 
a recession or from systemic risk and if it is able to be still well capitalized after these events.  
 Basel II was implemented because some institution did not meet some standards especially 
regarding the asset risk weighting system. Basel II.5 was developed after the 2007-2009 
financial crisis in order to create more rules to avoid the credit risk especially in the trading 
 16 
book of the bank (the securities that the banks will not hold until maturity and are accounted at 
current market value). Making the division between assets held until maturity and the ones 
which are sold before is not easy; Basel II.5 was focused on finding and also prevent an 
inappropriate placement of the securities that would give banks favorable accounting treatments 
but lead to miss capital buffer.  
 Basel III increases the amount of regulatory capital that the bank must hold. The rules also 
implement the provisions made by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (2010) that already regulated the capital reserve requirements for the banks.  
Basel III is focused on the creation of a new regulatory framework for the bank risk-based 
capital requirements. The reforms that the U.S. regulators already did before the new Basel 
framework, highlight how they were significant since the banks were already complying with 
the Basel regulation. Basel III was introduced to mitigate the risk of the international banking 
sector through the requirement of adequate leverage ratios and reserve capital. A new 
requirement introduced by this new framework is about the cyclical changes; in period of credit 
expansion the banks have to keep aside more capital whilst during period of contraction of 
credit, the banks can relax the capital requirement. More leverage and liquidity requirements 
have been introduced in order to avoid excessive borrowing allowing banks to have the liquidity 
they need.  
The U.S. agencies are making progresses regarding the introduction of and strengthening the 
requirements for banks. The U.S. requirements meets the Basel minimum standards with some 
deviations.  
 As mentioned in the previous sections, the interconnection between agents lead to the 
fragility of all the banks if one of them faces troubles and insolvency. The public policies have 
the power to mitigate both the likelihood and the severity of the systemic risk (Kaufman, 1996); 
the regulations should increase the macroeconomic stability and avoid the bubbles in the asset 
values. Some discretionary powers can be delegated to bank regulatory agencies in order to 
provide a safety net and to avoid unnecessary fire-sale losses from the asset sale by banks 
affected by runs on the banking system. The regulators should avoid the incentive incompatible 
policies and be focused on the reduction of the moral hazard behavior of the banks. The 
incentive to diminish this kind of behaviors the banks are asked to keep a sufficient level of 
capital and they are subject to sanctions in case they do not respect these requirements.  
In order to prevent the runs on the banks, the government can decide to offer an insurance 
to the small depositors up to a certain amount. These explicit insurances are helpful since it 
allows the depositors to reduce the expenses they would bear if they had to control alone for 
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the safety of their bank. The insure can also avoid the situations in which the depositors are 
more likely to run into currency and cause systemic risk. 
In the U.S., all the lending institutions that accept the federally insured deposits are the insured 
depository institutions and have to comply with regulations regarding the safety and soundness 
regulations (Bjorksten, 2014) that mainly consist in holding an adequate level of capital. A bank 
is considered solvent if it has enough capital above the threshold set by the Basel III. Under 
these rules, the banks’ assets have to grow proportionally if compared to the growth of capital.  
 Policies that lack of consistency or lead to wrong incentives for the banks can exacerbate the 
moral hazard and thus create more principal-agent problems. What the regulators should look 
at when deciding for new regulations are the systemic risk but also the non-systemic bank 
failures due to inadequate policies.  
 There is the possibility of reduction of the likelihood and the cost of banking failure without 
encountering strong moral hazard problems; this can be primarily done by the creation of 
effective system of structured early intervention and resolution (Kaufman, 1996).  
  
1.2.2 Inconsistent regulations: what are the effects? 
 
In absence of regulations or with less tight rules, the ability of the banks to maintain a minimum 
credit standard often erodes. As mentioned before, the minimum credit standard is needed in 
order to decrease the overall fragility of the banking system. A too high exposure to the credit 
risk increases the probability of default on loans causing a higher rate of default of banks.   
Banking crises are more likely to occur in a liberalized financial system (Detragiache, 1998). 
The external environment has a great impact on the financial stability: if it is strong, the fragility 
of the banking system is less intense. The financial liberalization leads the countries to ease the 
interest rate ceilings, lower capital reserves and also the entry barriers. Moreover, the 
government interference in the decision of capital allocation are reduced. During 1980s and 
1990s the financial liberalization in the led to more fragility in both developed and developing 
countries. The benefits that can come from the financial liberalization should be weighed 
against the cost of the fragility coming from these policies.  
 In countries in which the financial system is controlled in a tighter way, the banks have a 
ceiling on the interest rate they can charge and this allows to reduce the possibility for them to 
finance projects with a high level of risk. With the financial liberalization what commonly 
happen is that the interest rate ceiling is lifted up and thus, the riskier projects will be financed 
creating benefits for some customers that under other condition would have not received the 
financing. Hence, since the financial liberalization gives more freedom to the intermediaries, 
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the regulations in these conditions should be more effective. Moreover, the liberalization leads 
to more competition (that, as discussed before, can lead to a higher failure rate) and often to 
lower profits creating a distortion on the level of risk that the bank should take.  
 There are also conditions in which the financial liberalization does create distortions that are 
fully compensated by the benefits that the costumers are receiving and where the governments 
can implement regulations that avoid the market failures.  
It is important to notice that the effectiveness of the regulation is strictly connected to the 
environment in which the banks work. A consistent and adequate policy in one country can be 
totally a wrong fit for other banks. The regulators play a fundamental role in how a rule is 
implemented (Lucca, 2014).  
 As previously mentioned, in the U.S. the regulatory power is given to both the state and the 
federal authority that implement different rules and give distinct incentives. This dual system 
allows to keep under control what is happening both at a local level (state supervision) and at a 
national level (federal supervision). The conformation of the organization leads in some 
occasions to a competition that generate political interference giving the choice to the banks to 
choose the less strict regulation. Additionally, the dual system can cause a production of 
regulatory arbitrage that results in regulatory laxity and coordination problems as well. 
Generally, the federal regulator imposes more strict rules with respect to the state regulators. If 
the banking system is affected by a fragility it is necessary to analyze where it comes from. 
There can happen that the federal policies are too tight and impose costs which are not necessary 
or it can also happen that the state regulations are too lenient causing also a delay in the 
implementations of the corrective policies and having the effect of increasing the failure 
probability (Lucca, 2014).  
 Another important instrument that in the U.S. helps to failures given to the runs on the banks 
is the deposit insurance that has the drawback of working for banks as an incentive to internally 
take the failure risk possibly without constraints. This comes from the payoff structure in which 
the banks can make large gains leading the government to face large losses. This distortion can 
be reduced or eliminated by providing the shareholders a stake in the firm which is sufficiently 
high so they have incentives which are aligned with the ones of the depositors and the insurer.  
Moreover, a sudden withdraw cannot happen when there are high inflows of foreign capital and 
the domestic interest rate decreases while the foreign interest rate increases. In this way the 
domestic banking system can become illiquid if it was dependent from the foreign deposits. 
(Brinkmann, 1995)  
 The higher level of capital required by Basel III can reduce the insolvency risk which is 
costly for the FDIC but at the same time can imply more expensive bank credit for borrowers. 
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Moreover, bank capital reserves can have a restricted effectiveness in reducing the systemic 
risk since there is a large amount of lending which is outside the regulated banking system. 
 Some of the Basel III components are assessed as non-compliant; the two components that 
fall in this category are the securitization framework and the Standardized Approach for market 
risk. The first one is defined as “Materially non-compliant” (Branson, 2014) since there have 
been found divergencies between the U.S. rules and the standards required by Basel; indeed, 
the U.S. regulation lead to a lower securitization RWA outcomes if compared to the 
requirements of Basel III. Also the Standardized Measurement Method for Market Risk is not 
compliant since the U.S. rules implement only some of the required provision of Basel 
standards.  
Concluding, the causes that can lead to a failure of the banking systems are numerous. The 
regulations in the U.S. that help to reduce them can be more or less efficient also depending on 
the macroeconomic factors. In the next chapter there will be analyzed the importance of the on-






















2. PREDICTION OF FAILURES: ON-SITE AND OFF-SITE 
EXAMINATIONS 
 
The asymmetry of information which characterize the commercial banking world is driven by 
the impossibility for the market participants to have a clear view about what is happening to an 
institution in an accurate way. This leads to uncertainty and to the necessity of conveying more 
information even if it is costly (Flannery, 1999); it is important to mention that the most accurate 
source is available only to government which has the possibility of operating on-site 
examinations that are not accessible to private rating agencies, stock and bond investors and to 
depositors which are trying to detect the soundness of the institution.  
 Banks can be defined as opaque financial institutions (Berger, 1998) so the information that 
is acquired is private and costly for whoever is interested in the financial condition of the bank. 
Hence, the examination process should be directed towards this goal: gather information about 
the quality of the bank which otherwise would have been hidden and that can help investors 
and depositors to make the right decisions on the basis of their risk aversion. It also should help 
regulators whenever on-site examinations are not possible.  
Although regulators can have an advantage in reaching confidential information, they can 
face issues in being the best monitors and this role can sometimes be taken by institutional 
investors and bond rating agencies. Indeed, the private sector can find more interesting 
information given the incentive the participants may have; in these cases, the private sector 
gathers more accurate information even without an examination process as formal as the one 
implemented by the government. Clearly, the information available to government and to 
private sector can be really different and if the examination process gives the regulators an 
advantage in terms of information, this ends up to favor the regulatory discipline whilst if the 
process helps the private sector, it will be end in favor of the market discipline. 
 This chapter is based on the importance of finding information about the wealth of the 
financial institution, and on whether the data acquired are good enough to be used to predict 
the failure of a bank. There are different methods used by market participants to find interesting 
news about the banks that quite always end up in an analysis of the financial ratios regarding 
different characteristics of the institution.   
The Section 2.1 is focused on the ways in which the status of the bank can be analyzed; in 
particular, the paragraph 2.1.1 focuses on the strength and weakness points of the on-site 
examination, and the paragraph 2.1.2 instead, focuses on some particular off-site examinations. 
These off-site analyses can be accurate but it will be seen that there are some drawbacks 
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associated with them too. Lastly, the ection 2.2 contains a comparison between on-site and off-
site examination, discussing also the possibility of the on-site analysis to help consistently the 
off-site one.  
 
2.1 How to analyze the status of a bank?  
 
The analysis of the safety and soundness of the banks is necessary to understand if there will 
be failing institutions in the short, medium, and long term (whenever possible).  
 As previously mentioned, the banking system is permeated with hidden information and 
therefore, the participants in the market need to retrieve costly information with the instruments 
available for them.  
It can be said that the main purpose for the bank examination is the information acquisition 
(Berger, 1998); there can be identified three types of information retrieved by the examinations:  
1. Auditing information 
2. Regulatory discipline information 
3. Private information about bank conditions  
A more accurate analysis of the types of information will be discussed in the last section, 
explaining the relationship between on- and off- site examinations.  
When an analysis of the banks is done, it is necessary to understand if it have led to a good 
source of data or if the evaluation is not satisfying. The most important issue is to obtain 
sufficiently accurate information about the condition of the bank that affect in an important way 
the efficiency of the corporate governance (Berger, 2000).  
In order to analyze how the status of a bank can be detected, an initial distinction can be done 
between the on- and off- site examinations.   
The on-site examinations are exclusively conducted by the supervisors which have the right 
of analyzing all the details of an institution by going to its the headquarter and study several 
aspects which are otherwise not observable.  
The off-site examinations are mainly based on the information disclosed by the institutions 
through the Call Reports and hence, on the financial ratios. These ratios can be a really 





2.1.1 On-site examinations: difficulties and effectiveness of CAMEL  
  
The on-site examination is the approach with which the regulators can assess the probability of 
default of a banking institution. With this kind of method, the supervisor is able to detect 
difficulties of the individual banks in an accurate way. Indeed, the on-site supervision is a really 
effective and efficient tool through which the regulator can verify the current condition of the 
banks. 
The bank supervision, as seen in the previous chapter, is a crucial issue in order to avoid 
losses connected to the failure of a bank or, at least, to reduce the costs incurred. In order for 
the government to check the soundness of the banks, in 1991 was created a set of rules under 
the name of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). This Act 
obliged the U.S. banks to submit an examination (either federal or state) every 12 months or 
every 18 months (for the small and well capitalized banks). The examinations mainly focus on 
some components that help to understand if the institution is safe and sound; the most common 
used variables regard 5 different characteristics of the banks: capital protection, asset quality, 
management competences, earning strength, and liquidity risk exposure.  
This analysis is the so-called CAMEL which is considered the purest form of the on-site 
examination. In 1997 a sixth component was added to the analysis giving more importance also 
to the sensitivity to the market risk (CAMELS).  
These two approaches work in the same way, they include ratings for each individual 
component that goes from 1 (best rating) to 5 (worst rating). The evaluations assigned to each 
category depend on the on-site evaluation and they take into account both quantitative and 
qualitative characteristics. Once the rating is assigned to all of the 5 components (6 in the 
CAMELS case), an overall index is then computed through a weighting system. The result of 
these analysis allows the regulator to decide whether is better to take an action, i.e. by tightening 
the supervision or by allowing for more liberty. An index which results to be less or equal than 
2 is considered to detect high quality banks, whereas an index bigger or equal than 3 is assigned 
to institutions that are not properly safe and sound. The CAMELS index is considered one of 
the most accurate existent methods to study the financial situation of a bank but it has some 
drawbacks too that will be discussed later in this section.  
 In order to understand the CAMEL system, it is important to analyze what component ratings 
and composite ratings are.  
Component ratings: the regulators assign a value between 1 and 5 to the single components 
(Todd, 1996)  that they believe to be the most important to detect the different risks (Credit, 
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Interest Rate, Liquidity, Transaction, Compliance, Reputation and Strategic). The components 
are outlined below.  
 
Capital: the bank is required to hold a sufficient amount of capital in order to avoid to become 
not sound. When the regulators proceed to an on-site analysis, they take into account different 
aspect regarding the “capital” component. One of the first feature which is considered is the 
level of capital but also the quality of it; the regulators also look at the ability of the management 
to add more capital when it is needed. The capital level must be compliant with the regulatory 
requirements (Basel Committee requirements); the past experiences of the bank, the 
composition of the balance sheet and the growth plans are other elements which are taken into 
account. The adequacy of capital is measured also on the basis of the credit and market risk 
faced by the institution.  
After all the evaluations of the variables that affect the capital are completed, a rating is 
assigned. A rating of 1 determines that the bank has a strong level of capital if compared to the 
risk exposure; a rating of 2 means that the institution is holding a satisfactory amount of capital. 
The ratings between 3 and 5 are the ones that should worry the regulators. Indeed, a rating of 3 
means that an improvement has to be done since the amount of capital is less that what is 
considered satisfactory; a rating of 4 and 5 underlines a deficiency in the level of capital held 
by the bank which threatens the stability of the institution and which requires immediate actions 
of the shareholders and other sources which can be external.  
 
Asset Quality: the examination should also highlight excessive levels of risk associated to a 
poor quality of the assets (loans, investment portfolios, real estate, etc.). The management has 
to be able to detect Non-Performing Loans and in general all the loans that will be not repaid 
in full that create a deterioration in the quality of the assets for the bank. The regulators evaluate 
different factors before giving a rating; they check the nonperforming assets, the adequacy in 
the level of the allowances for losses in loans and leases, the level of the diversification of the 
assets in general, the adequacy of the policies regarding the investments, but also the ability of 
the management to implement internal controls on the assets and to handle the information 
system.  
After all the investigation is completed, the rating is selected; the ratings of 1 correspond to 
an asset quality considered strong that does not create concerns for the regulators. A rating of 
2 is given to the institutions that have a quality of the assets which is considered satisfactory 
and with really small weaknesses. The ratings of 3, 4, and 5 lead the regulators to worry about 
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the asset quality of the banks. In particular, the 4 and 5 ratings require immediate measures and 
additional control in order to avoid the deterioration of the value of the bank.  
 
Management: is the third component analyzed in the on-site examination. The assessment of 
management capability is not an easy task but it is fundamental to create a stable financial 
institution. A good management rating is assigned whenever the managers are actively involved 
in the life of the institutions and make decisions about the adequate levels of risks (credit, 
market, reputation, strategic, legal, liquidity, and so on). The oversight by the board of directors 
and by the management are considered extremely important in order for the bank to be sound. 
Internal decisions should be taken with an appropriate frequency taking into account all the 
internal and external risks that the bank is facing and it is supposed to face in the future.  
The management is also considered good whenever it supervises the adequacy of the internal 
controls; moreover, it should be focused on the promotion of policies which are effective and 
on the compliance to the regulations. Additionally, the managers have to demonstrate the 
willingness to maintain the bank safe and sound with their decisions.  
The on-site examination helps to reduce the asymmetries of information regarding the 
incentives of the managers; after the analyses are done, the regulator assigns the rating. The 
rating 1 is assigned in the occasion in which the management and the board of directors almost 
perfectly control the risk exposures. A rating of 2 is given when there are some minor 
weaknesses that do not largely affect the safety and soundness of the bank; the management is 
considered to operate in a satisfactory way and it is able to identify and monitor the major 
exposures. The 3, 4, and 5 ratings are assigned in cases in which the management lacks the 
instruments to observe the risks and to create efficient policies to maintain the bank safe and 
sound. In the worst cases, the regulators may require that the either the management or the 
board of directors is substituted or strengthened.  
 
Earnings: the fourth component of the CAMELS method regards the earnings. Specifically, 
when the on-site analysis is done, the regulators don’t necessarily look only at the trend and the 
amount of earnings but also at the quality of them and, in particular, to the nature of the factors 
that allow to register the earnings. If the ability of making positive returns is driven by elements 
which have a high possibility to deteriorate, the rating assigned will be high even if the earnings 
are extremely positive. Unstable earnings can be reported in cases in which the credit risk is not 
well managed or cases in which the market risk creates uncertainty given by the instability of 
the interest rates. There are many components that affect the quality of the earnings, some of 
 25 
them are: favorable tax effects, wrong forecast of the future operating expenses, inefficient 
business plans, etc.  
The rating of 1 means that the earnings are enough to support the continuity of the operation 
and are generated thanks to factors with a low level of risk that create stability for the bank. A 
2 rating is given in cases of earnings considered enough to allow the continuity of operations 
and to satisfy the capital requirements and whenever there is also the presence of either static 
or declining earnings. A 3 rating indicates the presence of earnings that are generated by other 
factors that do not fully sustain the stability of the operations. Ratings of 4 and 5 are given 
whenever the earnings are not sufficient to maintain the continuity of the operations and to 
earnings which are subject to instable trends (or negative trends). The regulators are concerned 
of these rating since the institution could find in a situation in which also the capital will be 
eroded.  
 
Liquidity: the level of liquidity should be enough to timely satisfy the needs of the bank and its 
financial obligations (i.e. bank runs issue). The analysis of the liquidity of the banks should take 
into account the unexpected events but at the same time, the management has to create a strategy 
for which the liquidity held is not going to create large costs. The banks have to hold in their 
balance sheets assets that are readily convertible in cash in case it was needed. It is important 
for the institution to have an easy access to the money market or to other sources of funding in 
case of necessity. What is taken into account while analyzing the liquidity level is also the 
reliance that the bank has on the short-term sources of funds which usually are volatile (i.e. 
borrowings) in order to fund the long-term assets. The liquidity in the banking system strongly 
depends on the amount of deposit held by the banks. Therefore, the trend and also the stability 
of the deposits will affect the rating given by the regulators.  
The ratings assigned depend of the strengthen of the liquidity levels. A rating of 1 is given 
when the level of liquidity is considered strong and when the bank has easy access to the 
resources to get liquidity almost immediately. A rating of 2 indicates that the level of liquidity 
is considered satisfactory but some weaknesses have been detected regarding the ability of the 
management to handle the sources of liquidity. A rating of 3, 4, and 5 lead the regulator to take 
some measures since they may need help from external sources in order to be safe and sound 
and avoid liquidity shortage.  
 
Sensitivity to Market Risk: it is included only in the CAMELS analysis and it helps the 
regulators to understand how the changes in components as the interest rate, the prices of 
commodity, the foreign exchange rates, and the equity prices can affect the banks’ stability. 
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The elements that have to be taken into account during these analyses are mainly the sensitivity 
of the banks to the previously mentioned variables but also the ability management is to keep 
under control the risks coming from unexpected changes in the market components. The 
management has to be aware of how much the institution can be affected by a change in the 
overall market risk. The sensitivity to market risk can be generated by the nature of the interest 
rate risk exposure coming from a nontrading position or from the presence of foreign operations 
in the balance sheet.  
 The regulators give a rating also to this component. As for the other analyses, the rating of 
1 is assigned when the market risk is under the accurate supervision of the management who 
can reduce the risks and who is able to minimize the potential reductions in the capital amount 
and the earnings. The rating of 2 is given when the sensitivity to market risk is not strong but 
there is a possibility that the amount of capital and the performance will be affected negatively 
by the increasing or unexpected market risk. The ratings 3, 4 and 5 are assigned whenever the 
institutions are sensitive to the market risk and the management actions are not satisfactory or 
even deficient; in these cases, the risk for the banks is to face a shrinkage in the capital held and 
a decline in the quality of earnings. In the worst cases, the regulators take action and can decide 
to make decisions on the management.  
 
Composite rating: as mentioned above, the CAMELS analysis ends up in a rating which is 
called “composite rating”. The number assigned to each institution depends on the ratings 
assigned to each component. The composite ratings depend on evaluation made on the basis of 
the managerial, operational, financial and compliance performance (Todd, 1996). The ratings 
go from 1 to 5; in particular:  
- Composite 1: this rating is given to institutions that have the characteristic of being 
sound in each and every aspect. This means that the rating assigned to the CAMELS 
components are really good (usually of one or two), highlighting a bank which is safe 
and sound in all of its areas. The weaknesses that can arise after the analysis or that are 
found during the examination are considered minor and can be easily handled by the 
management. The institutions with a 1 composite rating are resistant to most of the 
external shocks (i.e. financial instability) and they comply with all the regulations. Form 
these banks it can be expected a strong performance and the ability of manage efficiently 
the risk given that the management is aware of the size of the institution, and the 
complexity.  
- Composite 2: the banks that are fundamentally sound in every aspect but have some 
minor weaknesses receive a composite rating of 2. The institution is a candidate to 
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receive this rating if it does not receive a component rating worse than 3. As said before, 
the institutions have really few weaknesses that can easily solved by the management 
or by the board of directors. They comply with the laws in a satisfactory way and so, 
the regulators do not have concerns.  
-  Composite 3: the institutions to which a composite rating of 3 is assigned are considered 
not fully safe and sounds. The regulators have concerns about some components of these 
banks. The weaknesses that are found during the examination can be either moderate or 
severe. Usually, the worst component rating should not be worse than 4 to end up with 
a composite rating of 3. In these cases, the institution is characterized by a management 
which can be not fully prepared to timely reduce the shocks and to create strategies to 
reduce the overall risk. These institutions are hence more vulnerable if compared to the 
institutions that have a composite rating of 1 or 2. One issue connected to these banks 
is the noncompliance with the regulation that lead the regulators to be more focused on 
them and sometimes to operate more supervision. The banks with a composite rating of 
3 rarely fail but they need to strengthen some characteristics.  
- Composite 4: a composite rating of 4 is given to institutions that result to be not safe 
and sound from the examination. Their problems come from the way in which they are 
managed or from the financial situation in which they are. The bank is then considered 
to have severe criticalities and neither the management nor board of directors are able 
to handle them in a satisfactory way. These institutions usually do not comply with 
several regulations and they are not able to face the shocks and risks coming from the 
market. Indeed, the risk management strategies adopted usually do not fit the size and 
the complexity of the banks. The regulators often require for more regulations and 
enforcement actions since the lack of a plan could result in a failure or major 
weaknesses.  
- Composite 5: the composite rating of 5 is the worst the institutions can get after an 
examination is ended. These banks are considered extremely unsound and unsafe and 
they have plenty of issues regarding the performance. They can receive this rating if the 
management is not able to keep under control the risk taken and it does not decide a 
strategy sufficiently coherent with both the size and the complexity of the bank. The 
problems that arise are too severe to be controlled by the management, hence there is 
the need of immediate financial help from external sources and of more tight supervision 
from the regulator. The regulators are aware that the institutions with a composite rating 
of 5 are willing to fail with a high probability, creating also risks for the deposit 
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insurance fund. The composite rating of 5 usually highlights banks that are willing to 
fail in the next 12 months.  
 
The institutions that result to be weaker are subject to more frequent examination to reduce the 
probability of failure and to assure that the management will take a coherent level of risk with 
respect to the financial situation of the bank.  
 The rating which are given by the examiners after the on-site analysis lead the regulators to 
some choices: if a bank which was previously rated 1 or 2 and is downgraded to 3 in the last 
analysis, there will be concern for the supervisors which can decide to tighten the requirements, 
to change the policies, and to proceed with a more accurate examination to understand where 
the weaknesses come from. These institutions that are downgraded to a rating of 3 will be 
classified with the same index for a period that ranges from 6 months to few years before 
receiving an upgrade.  
 The downgrading to 4 and 5 ratings generates even more concern between regulators. These 
indexes detect institutions that have a high probability of failure and which are facing serious 
problems; the institutions which have been downgraded to 4 or 5 require timely actions and 
also an intensive monitoring from the regulators.  
 It is important to mention that the modern techniques to analyze the institutions can also start 
with an off-site examination: the periodic on-site analyses of safety and soundness begin with 
off-site “pre-exam” reviews of the data (Curry, 2003). The analysis proceeds with a more 
accurate on-site review that helps to check if the information was right and accurate. The on-
site examinations help to acquire data that are not present on the reports used for the off-site 
examinations. Indeed, it allows the regulators to be well informed since the quarterly financial 
data can be not enough to understand if a bank is safe and sound. Some of these data can be the 
percentage of nonperforming loans compared to the total loans the bank has in its balance sheet, 
and the level of adequacy of the provisions for the loan losses expected. In the previous chapter 
it has been explained the difficulty to retrieve information about the ability of the management 
to govern a bank; the on-site examiners can have a more detailed view about the role of the 
management and they are able to give a rating to it.  
 Additionally, the CAMELS ratings are more accurate since they include not only the 
financial condition of the banks but also their compliance with the laws and the regulations and 
their internal policies. The CAMELS method has not been created to exclusively study the 
probability of failure of institutions but it results to be a good approach to do so.  
 Although on-site examination can be really useful to study in a detailed way the institutions 
in all of their aspects, this method also has some drawbacks. The most important shortcoming 
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that has been found while considering the on-site examination is the lack of ability of the 
examiners to have a wide view of what it is happening during all the months between one 
analysis and another one. Indeed, the rating system allows to clearly study the bank in that 
precise moment but does not allow to include the changes that some variable will have in the 
case of changes of the economic and financial conditions.  
 The main issue that has to be cited is the speed with which the information content of the 
CAMELS rating decays (Cole, 1998). Since the financial conditions can be subject to rapid 
changes, the supervisory ratings given to an institution through the on-site examination can 
result to be not applicable for real long period of times. The FDICIA requires these 
examinations every 12 or 18 months. However, in many situations they are not enough accurate. 
Indeed, the most recent ratings can come from examinations that have been done days, moths 
or years earlier. For this reason, the CAMELS ratings which are based on exams that have been 
conducted close in time with respect to the exam period are expected to give a good forecast 
about the possibility of survive.  
The possibility that the information retrieved from the supervisory examination decays, leads 
the regulators to look for other sources of data that can be less accurate than a proper on-site 
examination but more accurate in case of which the on-site examination becomes old and no 
more trustable. For this reason, in some cases the off-site surveillance can become a powerful 
tool in order to predict the failure of the banks.  
 
2.1.2 Off-site examinations: are they viable?  
 
The aim of the examinations conducted by the regulators is primarily to reduce the probability 
of failure at the minimum possible level by detecting the institutions that are facing critical 
situations. As seen before, the on-site surveillance systems may be the most accurate ones but 
in some cases the regulators decide to fill the gaps with the off-site systems. These methods are 
also used by the other market participants that don’t have necessary power to discover all the 
information behind the rating given by an on-site exam.  
 Many monitoring systems have been developed in order to reach the highest possible level 
of accuracy. As mentioned before, the output of these examinations can also be used as starting 
point for an on-site examination.  
 Hereafter, some of the most known off-site systems that have been implemented to predict 




The Uniform Bank Surveillance Screen:  
 
The financial ratios are one of the best ways through which the market participants and the 
government can analyze off-site the situation of the institutions. During the mid 1980s, the Fed 
system decided to adopt the Uniform Bank Surveillance Screen (UBSS) as the primary system 
of surveillance. This UBSS system was used by the supervisor until 1993 when it was replaced 
by another system.  
 UBSS is a method that uses the financial data retrieved from the compulsory reports in order 
to identify the institutions with deteriorated financial ratios with respect to a peer group, 
composed by institutions that have similar characteristics (Cole, 1995).  
The UBSS takes into account 6 financial ratios that are computed using the quarterly financial 
data presented in the Call Reports. After all the ratios for every peer group are computed, they 
are rated from best to worst (for each group); the ranks are then summed up with each ranking 
obtaining the same weight. In this way, the resulting score helps to detect the institutions which 
need a higher level of analysis. Indeed, the banks with the highest composite ratings are then 
subject to a deeper off-site analysis. The reports that are created with the off-site surveillance 
can be used as analytical tools that include the effects of the decisions of the management, the 
economic condition of the bank, the performance, and also the balance sheet composition.  
When this kind of off-site information is used by the regulator, it allows to take decisions 
about the capital adequacy, the asset quality, the earnings, the liquidity, and the management of 
the bank itself. All the data that are used for this off-site monitoring are in the form of ratios, 
percentages or dollar amount. The UBSS allows to understand also how an institution is ranked 
if compared to the peer it belongs to. This method allows whoever conducts the analysis to 
combine data retrieved from different time periods for both the single bank and the peer group 
averages leading to the possibility to evaluate the current situation of the institution analyzed 
but also to investigate the trend of the performances.  
If the supervisors notice that the banks’ conditions have worsened since the last on- or off-
site analysis, they can decide to take actions to respond to this situation also asking to the banks 
for more information and explanations about the performance.  
 
CAEL System:  
 
During mid-1980s, the FDIC developed another surveillance system which is known as CAEL 
(Cole, 1995) which is similar to the UBSS system. It is an off-site examination is mainly based 
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on the quarterly data collected from the Call Reports. The CAEL system rates give rating on a 
scale between 0.5 and 5.5.  
The CAEL method allows to compute a rating which tries to imitate the CAMEL rating of an 
institution. Moreover, the CAEL scores are computed in a similar way if compared to the UBSS 
indexes; it is important to notice that the CAEL system is more complicated to implement with 
respect to the UBSS since it involves more financial ratios and more calculations.  
 The CAEL examination starts with the division of the banks analyzed into peer groups based, 
as for the UBSS, on the asset size. The rankings are then calculated for a group of 4 financial 
ratios which correspond to the 4 components of the CAEL. To each component is then assigned 
a rating (similar to the component rating of the CAMEL system) which is computed as the 
weighted average of the ratios previously computed.  
The procedure is concluded with the computation of a composite rating which is the weighted 
average of the 4 CAEL rankings. All the weights and the financial ratios that are used in the 
analysis are determined at the beginning of the examination by bank examiners.  
 CAEL has been used for a long period as a benchmark for accuracy (Collier, 2003). The 
CAEL system helps mainly to rate 4 components: Capital, Asset quality, Earnings, and 
Liquidity; it does not produce any information regarding the management since it is not easy to 
find appropriate ratios to identify the quality. The weighting system of the CAEL is more 
complicated than the one used to implement the UBSS. 
 
Limitation of UBSS and CAEL systems:  
 
The UBSS and CAEL surveillance systems are really helpful in order to understand the 
situation of the banks from different points of view. The scores which result from the analyses 
can also allow the regulators to identify the financial condition of an institutions in periods in 
which is not possible to compute an on-site examination.  
 Despite these methods seem to work smoothly, there are some limitations that should be 
underlined. The ratios used to compute the component ratings are subjective, meaning that they 
are not able to study the institutions completely resulting in an incomplete analysis. Whoever 
computes these kind of off-site examinations selects the ratios from a really large set of 
variables that can be studied and which are all correlated to the financial performance of a bank. 
The ratios which are chosen may be not inclusive and so they do not produce an accurate 
assessment of risk (Cole, 1995); there can exist other ratios that result more accurate.  
 Another limitation of these methods regards the choice of the weights through which the 
final composite rating is computed. There are cases in which the weights are chosen without a 
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statistical analysis; moreover, UBSS uses the same weight to each financial ratio even if some 
of them can be more valuable than others. At the same time, CAEL uses a fixed system of 
weights which is determined by a panel of bank examiners, this method can create issues in the 
case of shocks faced by the banks: the CAEL method does not allow for a timely adjustment of 
the weights.  
 Another drawback that can be identified is the dependence of the result on the initial peer 
group analysis. Both the methods considered have the common characteristic of dividing the 
banks into different per groups but they don’t change if there are variations in the asset size or 
in the performances. Consequently, an increase of rating of a single institution could not affect 




In the late 1990s the FDIC introduced another powerful tool to examine the condition of the 
banks. This method is still widely used by the supervisors as a valid off-site tool. The system 
was created in order to help the FDIC to detect the banks experiencing financial distress from 
the previous on-site examination. One of the primarily aims of the SCOR model is to identify 
all the institutions that have been considered safe and sound on the last on-site examination but 
that could have been downgraded since that time (mainly 1 and 2 rated institutions that have 
the characteristic of a 3 rated bank). Hence, the aim is to understand with are the institutions 
that will receive ratings of 3 or 4 in the next on-site examination. A possible downgrade to these 
ratings creates concerns because these institutions require more supervision and even more 
expenses in terms of insurance on the deposits. 
 The accuracy with which the SCOR system can identify institutions that are willing to 
receive a downgrade strongly depends on the Type I and II errors. Type I errors are the so called 
false negative; they are due to the inability of the examiners to detect institutions that were 
financially deteriorating and would have been eventually downgraded. Type II errors are false 
positive: they represent the percentage of banks that were safe and sound but have been wrongly 
considered subject to deterioration.  
 A Type II error of 100% implies a Type I error of 0%; this means that all the banks are 
considered to be downgraded. It is clear that the supervisors need to resolve a trade-off between 
these two kinds of errors. Both of them create costs which are unnecessary; in particular, the 
Type I error slows down the reaction of the supervisors to a possible downgrade, delaying the 
supervision. The Type II error instead leads to supervision costs that are not needed.  
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 If the SCOR system is chosen as an off-site analysis method by the FDIC, a case manager is 
assigned to every bank and if the bank is identified as deteriorated, the manager reviews all the 
information about that institution and decides if more actions are needed.  
 SCOR is a statistical method that compares the examination ratings with the financial ratios, 
it identifies which are the ratios that are more correlated the ratings given after the examination 
and that could help to forecast which will be the next on-site rating. It is important to notice 
that the SCOR model is also focused in detecting any changes in the relationship between ratios 
and ratings in order to be as much accurate as possible, also implying changes in the 
coefficients.  
 The SCOR rating is analyzed every quarter and is built in such a way for which the ratios 
and the rating can be taken for recent data; it also allows to eliminate the ratios whenever their 
correlation with the rating is not significant.  
 The aim of the model is to identify the probability for a bank to receive a specific rating and 
the probability of being downgraded. Only the “flagged” banks are then deeply analyzed by the 
case manager; if the flagged institution are too many to be analyzed, the flag is decreased. Under 
normal circumstances, the flag is assigned when the supervisors believe that the institution is 
going to be downgraded with a probability higher than 35%.  
 The accuracy of the model strongly depends on the time horizon. As showed in Figure 1 the 
accuracy decreases when the time horizon increases. At the same time, the SCOR method still 
has a positive accuracy even for 16-18 months. Usually, the forecasts for long periods of time 
are done for safe and sound banks and not for the institutions that are likely to face deterioration 




Source: (Collier, 2003) 
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The SCOR model is entirely based on financial ratios, this implies that if the reasons for the 
downgrade are of financial nature, the model can be accurate, whilst if the reasons are of 
operational nature the model will not be highly accurate. This limitation of the SCOR model 
implies that it is a useful off-site tool but it cannot fully substitute the on-site examinations 
which can detect problems in the banks even before they affect the financial conditions of the 
institution. Moreover, the on-site analyses can reveal distort financial statements.  
 SCOR system was introduced to obtain ratings more understandable than what was obtained 
by the CAEL method. Indeed, SCOR examination helps to determine some areas that lead the 
bank to be weaker also using weights for every component that allows to identify the cause of 
the low ratings. The model produces ratings for all the 6 components analyzed in the CAMELS 
examination (with some issues regarding the managerial area) and it also computes an overall 
rating through the system of weights.  
This particular system allows to understand which are the areas that create more problems to 
the institutions. The weight is used to make a comparison between a 2-rated benchmark 
institution and the bank analyzed. If the weight given is 10% it means that the component 
examined accounts for the 10% of the difference that can be identified with respect to the SCOR 
rating of the benchmark institution.  
 
Limitations of the SCOR system:  
 
As previously mentioned, the SCOR system has some issues in the computation of the 
management ratings. They cannot be associated to any financial ratio available to the off-site 
examiners. Indeed, several factors can only be studied with an on-site analysis since they are 
not disclosed. The examiners that conduct the SCOR analysis use ratios to understand the 
management condition of the bank, since they are the only available tools. For example, they 
look at the past due loans (30-89 days).  
 Other issues in correctly identifying a rating come from other factors that are not disclosed 
in the Call Reports. The Asset Quality can be an example: the rating for this component is given 
without really knowing the loans that are willing to default with a higher probability (default 
loans). The Capital rating is not fully accurate since it would require information which can be 
collected only with an on-site examination.  
 Additionally, as shown in Figure 2 the SCOR system is not accurate when the economy is 
prosperous but it is a useful tool in periods in which there is a recession. In any case, the SCOR 





Source: (Collier, 2003) 
  
SEER system:  
 
In the 1990s another surveillance system was created to analyze the condition of the banking 
system: the SEER (or Financial Institutions Monitoring System, FIMS). As stated above, the 
on-site examinations are the most effective tools for this purpose but they are bot costly and 
difficult to fulfill (Gilbert, 2002). The off-site examinations discussed since now in this chapter 
use the financial ratios taken from the quarterly financial statements as the primary element to 
use in the analysis.  
 The SEER model was created in order to use the econometrics inference to analyze the 
financial ratios; the main objective is to reduce the error caused by the subjective choices (i.e. 
about weights to assign to each ratio). The econometric model is extremely helpful in order to 
identify banks which could be downgraded and it allows to allocate the resources of the 
regulator in a more efficient way. Nevertheless, the econometric models have a limitation: they 
can be modified only after the new risk has been detected and has produced a series of effects 
on the safety and soundness that can allow to specify again the model.  
 The Fed implemented two different off-site econometric tools that belong to the same system 
called SEER (System for Estimating Examination Ratings). These two models are:  
- SEER risk rank model: it focuses on the risk of failure. It uses the financial data retrieved 
from the last Call Report to forecast which banks will default within a time period of 
two years. This model is used as off-site monitoring system because it helps to find the 
financial variables that predict in a consistent way the risk of default. It is a fixed 
coefficient model that allows to take into account the reasons of the changes over time 
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of the financial performance of a bank. The SEER risk rank model is a probit regression 
that uses the information in the Call Repost to identify all the institutions that will fail 
in the next two years or institution that will have a tangible capital below the threshold 
of 2% with respect to the total assets.  The model has the characteristic of being 
frequently updated to detect any important chances on the status of health of banks. The 
updates regard the financial ratios included in the analysis. The SEER risk rank model 
outputs either 0 or 1 which respectively indicate willing-to-fail and survival banks 
(Cole, 1995).  
- SEER rating model: it focuses on the risk of receiving a high rating (3, 4 or 5). It also 
uses the last Call Report to create a “shadow CAMELS rating” (Gilbert, 2002) for every 
institution that will be examined on-site. An estimation of the CAMELS rating is 
computed looking at the financial statement available every three months. This method 
allows to study the relationship between the financial performance today and the 
condition of the institution in the future allowing any changes in the aspects that create 
lack of safety and soundness. The SEER rating model is a multinomial logit regression 
used to forecast which will be the future CAMELS rating given the information 
available on the Call Report. Hence, it tries to forecast both which will be the next rating 
but also which the rating would have been if the on-site examination was done on that 
date. In order to be as much coherent as possible, the SEER rating model uses constantly 
updated data: whenever a new report is disclosed, the new shadow CAMELS is 
computed. The model also takes strongly into account the results of the on-site 
examinations computed by the supervisors. Usually the SEER rating model is 
implemented using the data from the two most recent quarters in order to minimize the 
error (Cole, 1995). Since the model tries to estimate a CAMELS rating, it outputs a 
number between 1 and 5. 
The financial ratios that are used in order to complete these econometric analyses are chosen 
on the basis of the most important ratios that affect the CAMELS model.   
The main goal is to be as more accurate as possible avoiding to misclassify the institutions. The 
SEER system has been created in order to give to the supervisors the best possible off-site 
estimation tool. This method presents several advantages with respect to the ones proposed 
earlier. First of all, the model is really accurate while estimating the financial conditions of an 
institution and its probability of default. SEER also guarantees the possibility for the regulators 
to gain objective measures regarding the health of the banks (Cole, 1995). Another advantage 
of the SEER model regards the fact that the outputs obtained from the examinations are 
consistent and timely.  
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 An important difference with respect to other models as the UBSS and CAEL that can be 
underlined is the ability of SCOR to include new variables whenever they are considered useful 
tools to examine the financial condition of the banks. The UBSS and CAEL systems use a set 
of fixed financial variables that can be difficultly changed.  
 To conclude, SEER offers a consistent, timely, accurate, and objective result that can be 
trusted by the regulators. It allows to use the resources in a more efficient way and to avoid 
with a higher probability the failure of the banks while it is not possible to compute an on-site 
examination.  
 
2.2 Comparing on-site and off-site examinations 
 
The asymmetries of information that characterize the banking sector is due to data that cannot 
be disclosed by the institutions since they are private and cannot be shared with the market 
participants. For this reason, depositors, rating agencies and investors interested in 
understanding the condition of a bank have to rely sometimes on less accurate analyses.  
 As seen before, the government can find more accurate information since it has the power 
to operate on-site examinations in which private information are analyzed.  
 On-site examinations can be computed only by the government which has the power of 
controlling the status of banks every 12 months or 18 months in case in which the banks are 
small and are well capitalized. This is a really useful tool for the regulators to detect those banks 
that need stricter rules since there are weaknesses in one or more areas evaluated. The 
possibility of seeing the institution so in depth helps the regulators to avoid the failure of the 
banks which show deficiencies. The most frequently used system is the so-called CAMELS; 
where the supervisors have the possibility of talking to managers, director and personnel.  
The two most relevant examinations that can be done are: the risk focused supervision and 
the full scope examination. The first one is mainly focused on the level risk that the institution 
is facing and if that level is coherent with the size and the characteristics of the bank. In order 
to maintain the safety and soundness requirements, the financial institutions have to choose an 
exposure to risk which can be maintained for a long period avoiding the default of important 
weaknesses. The examiners identify all the risks (liquidity, credit, marker, etc.) and can decide 
to require stricter rules in order to lower the level of exposure of to maintain it under control.  
The full scope examination is focused on the assessment of the adequacy of the management 
of risk but it also concentrates on the IT, Anti-Money Laundering and compliance with the 
requirements (FDIC, 2019).  
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 The on-site examinations are really helpful to the regulators but they are not available to all 
the other participants which create their own off-site surveillance systems. Although these 
methods seem to be useful for whoever does not have access to the on-site examination 
documents, they are widely used also by the government. The reason is that in the months 
between two on-site examinations several issues can arise for an institution. The accuracy of 
the on-site examination in the exact moment in which it is computed is high but it lowers with 
time.  
 Off-site analyses can be more or less accurate depending on the choices made by the 
examiners; there are cases in which every variable chosen is subjective (financial ratios and 
weights) and this can lower the truthfulness of the information retrieved. The econometric 
models can be sometimes more difficult to carry on. The off-site examiners have different 
documents that can be useful such as: Call Reports, Wall Street Analyses, other Reports, etc. If 
the market participants can interpret the public information in an efficient way, it can also 
happen that the off-site examinations can complement the on-site monitoring system (Curry, 
2003).  
Other useful tools that can be used to improve the off-site analyses are the market signals; 
indeed, they can improve the prediction accuracy of these methods. These variables are: the 
return volatility and the trading volume. In particular, an increase in the return volatility 
happens when the institution is willing to default. The analysis computed by Cole in 2003 
showed how the stock market variables are effective only for the distressed institutions that 
have obtained a rating of 4 or 5 on the last on-site examinations. The prediction value decreases 
for the wealthier banks.   
In the recent years, an increasing attention has been given to modern machine learning 
techniques which, in some cases, can help the off-site examiners to predict the failures. These 
techniques will be discussed in the next chapter and will be the focus of the empirical analysis.  
In the next paragraph it will be studied if the on-site analysis can be helpful to improve the 
off-site examination or if, instead, the off-site examinations do not use the information retrieved 
from the CAMELS analysis in order to be completed.  
 
2.2.1 Can CAMEL method help the off-site examination?  
 
On- and-off site examinations are focused on detecting the institutions with a weak structure 
that can cause instability of the overall banking system.  
 There are two points of view regarding the correlation between on- and off-site 
examinations: one clearly states that the on-site surveillance can implement the accuracy of the 
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information that are retrieved from the off-site analyses. The other one, contrarily, states that 
the data that the market participants get from the off-site examinations are not dependent on the 
CAMELS analyses.  
The aim is to understand if the investors interpret the financial statements of the banks in a 
different way if the bank has been examined and so if the on-site examination affect the value 
of the banks.  
  The first point of view is supported by the fact that, even if the information contained in the 
on-site analysis is private and confidential, the on-site regulators can also decide to ask for the 
disclosure of more accounting documents that will be available to the public implying a more 
accurate off-site analysis. The market interprets the information in a different way when the 
banks was subject to a recent examination.  
 Another point of view states that the on-site surveillance system does not help the off-site 
examination. This is particularly true during periods in which there is an economic expansion 
when the banking industry is living a profitable period and is characterized by a good quality 
of the assets. In these cases, it also can be seen that the on-site downgrade models outperform 
the off-site surveillance systems (Gilbert, 2002).  
 After the examination of the ways in which the on-site information affect the off-site 
examinations; it is also needed to consider in which way the information can reach the market: 
there are cases in which the information reaches the participants in an illegal way and there are 
other cases in which the market just responds to data which are disclosed in public documents. 
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the types of information that can be identified 
are three: the auditing, the regulatory and the private information. 
- Auditing information can be really efficient for the bank to disclose useful information 
to the market but it is costly to produce (compliance costs). Moreover, other costs that 
are faced by the banks are the ones associated to the possibility that the regulator will 
ask the institution to change its behavior since the risk taken is increasing.  
- Regulatory discipline information is another kind of information that can be transmitted 
to the market. It usually is the information that is disclosed when a bank has been 
downgraded and has to follow stricter regulations. In cases of upgrades the information 
disclosed is not useful for market participants.  
- Private information can also be transmitted by the banks to the market in order to let the 
public to know the situation of the bank. This information can regard the ability of the 
borrowers to repay the loans or any other information that is not disclosed with the 
quarterly financial statements.  
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This information tends to affect more the off-site examinations whenever the institutions are 
downgraded to ratings of 3, 4 or 5.  
 Given the importance of the off-site examinations shown in this chapter, in the next chapter 
it will be discussed more in detail these kinds of analyses applying both statistical and machine 































3. MACHINE LEARNING AND STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES   
 
Last chapter highlighted the importance for the regulators and other market participants to use 
off-site analyses and early warning systems in order to be aware of the health of the banks. In 
order to understand if there are methods which are more accurate than other, a comparison 
between the statistical and the machine learning techniques is needed.  
 It is fundamental to detect the banks that need tighter regulations in order to avoid failures. 
The FDIC reported that during the period 2008-2014 the number of banks that were declared 
failed was more than 500. The main problem is that the cost of default for each dollar of failed 
bank asset is high and it is forecasted to increase. If the bankruptcy rate of the financial 
institution increases, the costs for resolving the after-failure events. At the end of the 2013 an 
estimation made by the FDIC highlighted that the cost to the fund of deposit insurance in order 
to resolve the defaulted banks was higher than $ 30 billion (Le, 2016).    
During the period 2007-2010 the increase in the in the bank failures also led to an increase 
of the costs for the FDIC. In 2007 the cost was $0.21 billion, in in 2008 the cost raised to $ 
19.86 million, and in 2010 the cost reached $ 37.35 billion.  
 The creation of Early Warning Systems can be useful supervisory tool (Sinkey, 1975)  since 
they can allow the banking system agencies to:  
- allocate the resources in a more efficient way reducing the costs 
- use in a more efficient the preexisting data 
- provide some information in order to assess the deposit insurance premiums 
- include some objective criteria in the valuation  
 The majority of the studies that are focused on the analysis of the bank performance and the 
prediction of the failure are based on the financial ratios as explanatory variables. The ratio 
analysis takes into account several indicators; the usefulness of these indicators must be tested 
with respect to the purpose of the prediction of banking failure (Beaver, 1966). In this chapter 
will be studied and compared only methods which involve the financial ratios since they 
showed to be the best predictors 
 The prediction of banking failure is an important topic since many years and the methods to 
detect the insolvent institutions are many. From 1960s the interest in this field increased and 
lead to some of the most relevant methods which are still used nowadays (with some small 
changes).  
 The cruciality of a bank failure leads the creditors, stockholders, auditors, etc. to find a way 
to analyze the future of the institution. The health of a bank depends on different drivers and 
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on the environment in which it is working in; as studied by Ravi Kumar et al. (2007), the 
possibility for the institution to be competitive in the industry depends upon:   
- Financial solvency; 
- Possibility to create in an efficient way a stream of cash directly coming from the 
continuous operations; 
- Ability to quickly have access to capital; 
- Capability of maintaining the competitive position even in case of unexpected cash 
shortfalls.  
In order to build a model that can be useful in different scenarios, the different techniques 
which are applied should take into account some aspects such as: the source through which the 
data are retrieved, the choice of different financial ratios (their correlation with the dependent 
variable and their significance level), the numbers of years prior to failure to consider in the 
study, etc.  
Hence, in this chapter will be done a review of the most relevant literature concerning the 
prediction of banking failure analyzing both the statistical techniques and some of the machine 
learning techniques. The techniques that will be studied are all classification methods which 
are supervised. In particular, in the Section 3.1 the statistical methods will be presented whilst 
Section 3.2 focuses on the machine learning techniques.  
 
3.1 Statistical methods  
 
In order to get accurate and useful off-site analyses, one of the most powerful instruments that 
has been widely used is the statistical tool. With the help of the financial statement information, 
the bankruptcy prediction models can be implemented; the choice of the financial ratios and/or 
other variables is extremely important during the whole process. In general, the two most 
important choices that has to be taken are: the technique to use and the explanatory variable to 
gather from financial statements or other sources.  
Different statistical methods have been applied in order to predict the banking failures; some of 
them are listed hereafter.  
 
3.1.1 Logistic regression (or logit):  
 
Logistic regression is a classification algorithm which is able to produces a binary output. It is 
an adaptation of the linear regression model which is used when the output variable is 0 or 1 
(binary). It is implemented when there is a need of a prediction of an event and the historical 
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data are given. This method comes from an adjustment of the ordinary linear regression, the 
process consists in the creation of a linear combination of the variables used as inputs and then 
on the application of a function which maps the number between 0 and 1 which allows to use 
the logit as a classification method. The function which is used to map is the logistic function 




Source: (Altman, 1968) 
 
Where the sigmoid function is:  𝜎(𝑡) = 11 + 𝑒−𝑡 
 
This method has been widely used in the banking sector as an off-site method to predict the 
banking failures. The majority of the studies that use the logistic approach (but also other 
approaches) gather information about failed banks from their financial statements and then 
compares these data with the ones collected for the healthy banks. The analyses can be done 
also 1-2 years prior to failure but, as it will be seen later and as it was stated in chapter 2, the 
accuracy of the models usually decreases with time. Another method that can be used to predict 
the failure of the banks is the creation of a priori probabilities which are independent from the 
historical values of the actual default. Additionally, other approaches to predict the failure 
consist in the analysis of the deviation of the individual bank’s ratios from a peer group of 
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similar institutions. The usefulness of the models used and implemented strongly depends on 
how well the data fit on the estimated ones but also on the ability of the model to be stable as 
time increases.  
 
Martin (1977) understood that the banking system needed some statistical techniques that 
could have been applied to the financial statements of the banks. The early warning system had 
to be able to forecast the probability of default of the banks. He gave a definition of “bank 
failure” which is a situation in which the net worth becomes negative and/or the institution is 
no more able to continue its operation with large losses. The study completed by Martin (1977) 
was one of the first applications of logit model to the prediction of the bank failures, using as 
explanatory variables the financial ratios and other macroeconomic indicators. The author 
focused on the time period 1970-1976 and created a small subset of financial ratios (asset risk, 
liquidity, capital adequacy, and earnings). The classification accuracy coming from this 
analysis shows that the logit model implemented using these ratios is useful.  
 
Ohlson (1980) used a dataset derived from 10-K statements from the period 1970-1976. The 
most important findings are 2:  
- The possibility of identifying the factors which are statistically significant in order to 
predict the banking failure (dimension of the bank, measures of performance, measures 
of current liquidity, etc.)  
- One of the biggest threats of the models is to overstate the predictive power, it is needed 
to test the ratios and the model.  
The logistic regression has some advantages with respect to other methods that will be 
discussed later. Regarding the distribution of the predictors, the variance-covariance matrix 
doesn’t need to be the same for both the groups (failed and non-failed). The output coming from 
the logistic model is easily interpretable (0 or 1) and helps to avoid the misclassification.  
 
 Thomson (1991) used the logit model in order to predict the bank failures and reduce all the 
costs correlated to that. The correctly implemented EWS are extremely useful for regulators in 
order to take decisions that may result in really high costs for the FDIC and the taxpayers. The 
FDIC while controlling the banks have some troubles in identifing all the important aspects due 
to different causes (imperfect information, budget constraint, principal-agent conflicts, 
administrative constraints, etc.). The analysis showed that the most two important indicators 
are the solvency and liquidity of a bank which are able to predict the failure up to 30 months 
before the failure. Other elements that demonstrated to be relevant for this purpose are: the asset 
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quality, earnings, and management. With this model the overall estimation error (computed as 
weighted sum of Type I and Type II error) ranges from 6.86% (when the failure happens in 6 
to 12 months) to 18.56% (when failure happens in 36 to 42 months). The Type. I, Type II and 
overall error increase with time, demonstrating that accuracy decreases as time increases. The 
author applied the logistic regression technique also to test the out-of-sample data; also in this 
case the results were satisfactory and accurate.  
 
 Jagtiani et al. (2003) showed the importance of the capital adequacy in the banking system, 
underlying that the satisfaction of the capital requirements are fundamental for the health of a 
bank. In their analysis they hence focused on the capital adequacy, assigning 0 to the capital 
inadequate banks and 1 to the capital adequate ones. The institutions with a low capital 
adequacy are different from the other banks looking at their financial statements. The study is 
interesting since the authors compare two different early warning models: a simple logit model 
and a more complex model. The former takes into account only the capital ratio and the lagged 
change in that ratio; it showed an overall accuracy of prediction of 79.76% (with a Type I error 
of 21.05%). In particular, the model predicted in an accurate way 30 of the 38 capital inadequate 
banks. The latter, including more than 40 explanatory variables, predicted accurately the failure 
of 29 banks over 38 and resulted in a Type I error of 76.32%).  
The result of this study showed that that Early Warning Systems effectively work even if they 
are simple; if they use the right predictors, the accuracy is going to be high. The authors also 
underline how the marginal cost of developing new ratios is not high if compared to the cost of 
a bankruptcy. Together with the EWS it is also needed to examine the data and to be aware of 
the two types of error produced by the model.  
 
The logistic regression approach was also applied by Taha (2013), that showed how this 
method could be adopted to discriminate between two types of banking groups: health banks 
from the institutions which are in a difficult situation. His study included a set of account ratios 
taken from the individual financial statements of the banks chosen as targets. The ratios were 
selected to show the behaviors of the banks, and their macroeconomic activities; they were used 
as explanatory variables. In particular, the author finds ratios that can be associated to 5 groups 
(liquidity, management, activity, profitability, and vulnerability). The result of this study 
showed that the most important ratios to determine the failure of the banks are the bank 




Zavgren (1985) applied the logistic regression model to a sample of failed and non-failed 
industrial firms. His study can also be applied to the banking system. The aim of the study was 
to implement a logit technique in order to verify how accurate it is when time from the failure 
event increases (she used a period of time of 5 years). The results of this research demonstrated 
that the information that can be retrieved from the model is significant also 5 years prior to 
failure.  
Many of the studies that implemented the logit approach in order to predict the failure of the 
banks highlighted the importance of selecting the right database and the right ratios. The 
decision can be sometimes too subjective and lead to less accuracy.  
 
3.1.2 Multiple Discriminant Analysis (or MDA)  
 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis is a statistical technique that has been widely used for 
classification purposes. The observation is classified in one of the groups which has been 
identified a-priori. In order to implement this method, the first step that has to be done is the 
selection and creation of the groups, once this process is done, the data can be collected. The 
MDA tries to find a linear combination of the characteristics which best discriminate between 
groups (Altman, 1968).  
The Multiple Discriminant Analysis technique has the power of considering the interactions 
between the characteristics taken into account. Furthermore, MDA allows to reduce the space 
dimensionality; if the analysis’ goal is to discriminate between bankrupt and non-bankrupt 
institutions, the whole analysis will be transformed in one dimension.  
The discriminant function has the form:  
 
Z = v1x1 + v2x2 + … + vnxn 
 
v1,…, vn = Discriminant coefficients 
x1, …, xn = Independent variables (ratios)  
 
It transforms the variables into a discriminant score (Z) that is then used to classify the object. 
In particular, the greater the probability for a bank to default, the lower the discriminant score. 
MDA has the objective of detect all those variables that help to better discriminate between 
groups and which instead, are similar within the group.  
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 Many studies applied the Multiple Discriminant Analysis to bankruptcy problems. One of 
the most relevant study has been conducted by Altman (1968), after the analysis conducted by 
Beaver (1966), who implemented the method to predict corporate bankruptcies. As seen in the 
previous chapter, the banks are different from other entities but some of the studies that have 
been conducted to predict the corporate failures are a good fit for banking system too. The 
author focused on the importance of the choice of the financial ratios for the analysis, using a 
multiple discriminant analysis to avoid the drawbacks coming from the univariate models. In 
particular, the univariate analysis can lead to erroneous interpretations and to confusion. The 
ratios have been selected through a procedure that included: the observation of the significance 
level of different indicators, the study of the intercorrelation between variables, the analysis of 
the prediction accuracy, and a final judgement made by the analyst. The a-priori groups need 
to be statistically different.  The ratios that have been selected are:  
- Working Capital / Total Assets  
- Retained Earnings / Total Assets  
- EBIT / Total Assets 
- MV Equity / BV of Debt  
- Sales / Total Assets  
The final analysis underlined the high accuracy and predictive power of the Multiple 
Discriminant Analysis, showing that the predictive power is high up to two years prior the 
failure (after the second year, the accuracy rapidly decreases).  
 
Sinkey (1975) focused on the time period 1969-1973; the banks have been chosen based on 
different characteristics in order to be part of the sample (location, total amount of deposit held, 
number of branches, and Fed membership). In his analysis he took into account several ratios 
but also some factors not so easy to define: the quality of management and the honesty of the 
employees. The ratios have been extracted from the year-end financial statements in such a way 
to cover some of the most relevant areas: liquidity, loan operations, asset composition, deposit 
composition, efficiency, profitability, and capital adequacy (Sinkey, 1975). Thanks to the 
power of the discriminant analysis, the group mean vectors and dispersion matrices are 
significantly different for all the years that have been considered. The Type I error (which 
consists in the wrong classification of a problem bank) decreased over time (46.36% in 1969 to 
28.15% in 1972).  
 
Tai (1986) focused on the question “Who is next?”; the ability of understanding which will 
be the future bank to fail, as mentioned, is the focus of many researches. Six financial ratios 
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were used in the analysis to discriminate between fail and non-failed banks. The study showed 
that the Multiple Discriminant Analysis is an accurate model (90.91% of classification accuracy 
with an overall classification rate of 9.09% and a 18.18% Type II error).  
 
 Cox and Wang (2014) demonstrated how the Type II error can be reduced thanks to a 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis. The authors also discussed other types of discriminant analysis 
such as the Linear Discriminant Analysis and the Quadratic Discriminant Analysis.  
LDA is a method that it is used also for classification purposes to separate two or more 
classes of events. It uses the Bayes Theorem in order to retrieve the class probability from the 
probabilities of predictors. The model requires some assumptions on the data: it requires that 
the independent variables are normally distributed and it also requires that in each class the 
features must have same var-covar matrix (but different means). As MDA, LDA also allows to 
reduce the space dimension.  
LDA applies the Bayes Theorem to gather the class probability from predictors probabilities. 
The aim is to decide the class of the subjects given the values of the features. The decision rule 
for the Bayes classifier is to assign X=x to the class k for which the discriminant function is the 
largest (where the discriminant function is a statistical function that classifies the unknown 
observations and gives the probability of being classified in a certain class). LDA approximates 
the Bayes classifier using estimates for the mean, variance, and also for the probability. Here 
the discriminant function is given by the equation:  
 𝛿𝑘(𝑥) = 𝑥 𝜇𝑘?̃?2 − 𝜇𝑘22?̃?2 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔(?̃?𝑘) 
Where:  𝜇𝑘 = 1𝑛𝑘 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖:𝑦𝑖=𝑘  
and  




Where ?̃?𝑘 =𝑛𝑘 𝑛⁄  is the estimated probability that an observation belongs to the class k. Hence, 
the LDA classifiers uses the estimates and then assigns the observation X=x to the class for 




Quadratic Discriminant Analysis can be considered a generalization of the LDA model in which 
the discriminant function is quadratic; this method does not require for all the variances to be 
equal. The choice between LDA and QDA is mainly done on the basis of the bias-variance 
tradeoff: QDA needs to estimate more parameters, it has a low bias but a high variance.  
The results obtained by Cox and Wang (2014) show that LDA is a better predictor for the banks 
which are willing to survive (overall accuracy which is in the range 70.69%-94.92%) and QDA 
better predicts the banks which are willing to fail (the prediction accuracy varies from 62.66% 
to 79.72%).  
 
In order to construct an appropriate prediction model, a PCA can be conducted in order to 
understand which are the most important variables that capture the highest level of variance. In 
the case of the prediction of bank failures the aim is to detect the most relevant ratios that can 
explain the variation in the health of the banks. PCA (Principal Component Analysis) helps to 
clarify which is the underlying pattern of the relation between the explanatory variables which 
have been chosen.  
Canbas et al. (2005) created an EWS including the use of PCA and finding three main 
components that explains the largest variance of the model. These components have then been 
used as independent variables in order to implement other models. A discriminant model was 
chosen ad predictor technique with the aim of maximizing the variance between groups and 
minimize the variance within the groups. The resulting model showed a high prediction 
accuracy and a low overall error.  
 
As seen before, the MDA is helpful to reduce the space dimensionality, to derive a linear 
combination of the features that best discriminate the dependent variable, and to take into 
account the interactions between the relevant characteristics (Altman, 1968). Moreover, one of 
the biggest advantages of MDA is that it is capable of analyzing the important features in a 
simultaneous way instead of a sequentially way.  
 
3.2 Machine Learning methods 
 
The banking crises of late 1980s and early 1990s, the broadening of the regulations, and the 
needs of the customers lead the regulators to find a new prediction method or to improve the 
existing ones in order to avoid the economic instability. New prediction models have been 
studied and have been compared to the older approaches to understand if the prediction power 
could be increased.  
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Machine learning techniques have the advantage of both learning and adapting. They learn 
from the input data (specifically the ones used as training) and then improve their performance. 
This allows to reduce the costs and the risk associated with a wrong implemented model.  
The previous section highlights that the prediction accuracy of the statistical models strongly 
depends on the initial decisions regarding many factors. In this section there will be analyzed 





ML methods are able to fit the relationships 
which are not linear  
 
ML techniques are often compared to Black 
Boxes since the middle layers cannot be 
interpreted.   
 
Can result in a high accuracy if implemented 
with the appropriate set of variables 
Can be too sensitive to the outliers and can 
lead to overfitting problems. 
 
 
Source: (Leo, 2019) 
 
All the techniques that will be cited can be more or less accurate than other methods; this does 
not only depend on the technique itself but especially on how it is implemented. 
 
3.2.1 Artificial Neural Network (ANN)  
 
 The Artificial Neural Network technique is inspired by the biology and it is extremely 
helpful for the classification purposes but also for clustering and pattern recognition issues. It 
has been created following the procedure that the human central nervous system follows; it is a 
complex system of highly interconnected neurons.  
The neuron can be described as a microprocessor that is able to receive and is able to associate 
the signals that come from other neurons. The Artificial Neural Network is composed by 
different elements that allow to process the inputs to transform them in outputs. The inputs and 
the outputs are connected thanks to some elements which are placed between them.  
There is also a system of weights; every connection is multiplied by a weight (comparable to 
the synaptic strength on neural connection) (Bell, 1997).  
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The Neural Network technique is mainly based on two aspects:  
1. Learning Process. It is an iterative process that allows to improve the weights and the 
procedures in order to get a better result.  
2. Recall. Uses the weights which are obtained during the learning phase.  
NN models is useful to map the relationships between variables which are really complex and 
between the inputs and outputs. Works to solve nonlinear problems due to its nonparametric 
nature.  
 
Neural Networks don’t make any assumptions regarding the distribution of the data and is 
useful even if the input data are noisy and/or incomplete. The possibility of adjusting the model 
once required by the environment which is changing.  
This technique requires to define some elements to be implemented; the initial weights, the 
numbers of hidden layers, the learning rate (use to adjust the weights during the process which 
varies between 0 and 1), and the outlier factor coefficient have to be chosen.  
A deeper description is needed for the learning rate; a small rate extends the time for the training 





Source: (Bell, 1997) 
 
 The Figure 4 shows the input layer that corresponds to each explanatory variable that has 
been chosen at the beginning (i.e. financial ratios selected for prediction purposes). The middle 
layers can be multiple (here only one hidden or middle layer is shown); the input layers is fully 
interconnected with the middle layer nodes. After the middle layers are created, a transfer 
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function is applied to show the output layer. Usually, the transfer (or activation) function for 
classification purposes is the sigmoid function but other functions that can be used are the 
hyperbolic tangent function or the multilayer perceptron.  
The aim is to modify both the weights and the bias to getting closer to a more precise output. 
With backpropagation the algorithm will learn and weights are changed over and over to 
improve the output in particular the change in output is given by the equation:  
 ∆𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 ≈ ∑ 𝜕𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝜕𝑤𝑗 ∆𝑤𝑗𝑗 + 𝜕𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝜕𝑏 ∆𝑏 
 
Changes in weights and bias will lead to small changes in output.  
 NN method also requires, as mentioned above, a training process. One of the most common 
training rules is the back-propagation algorithm which is based on the idea that the connection 
weights are responsible for the error of the output. With the backpropagation function the error 
is propagated back through the network the network and it is then used to adjust the connection 
weights to minimize the error, a gradient descent is commonly used; this allows to increase the 
efficiency. Another way to transfer the information is the Feed-forward that forwards the 
information from the input nodes to the output ones.  
  
Swicegood and Clark (2001) applied to the same sample of regional banks both the MDA 
model and the NN in order to evaluate which model is more accurate. MDA correctly predicts 
86.4% of the failed banks whilst the NN prediction power is 81.4%. Nevertheless, NN has a 
Type I error which is lower than the MDA. Indeed, NN shows a higher accuracy once a higher 
weight is given to Type I error.  
 
Lee and Choi (2013) used the Back propagation Neural Network algorithm in order to 
indagate if it us a better predictor than the Multiple Discriminant Analysis. They consider as 
important features to predict the bank failures: profitability, growth, productivity, liquidity, and 
asset quality. The BNN outperforms the MDA since it can capture the nonlinear relationship 
between the independent variables.  
 
Bell (1997) compared on the same sample a statistical and a machine learning technique: 
logit analysis and Artificial Neural Network have been used in order to understand which of 
the model have the highest prediction accuracy. The analysis revealed that none of the two 
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methods dominates the other, leading the author to state that both ANN and Logit show a good 
predictive power in that specific context.  
 
3.2.2 Support Vector Machines (SVM)  
 
 Support Vector Machines was developed by Vapnik in 1998 hence it is a relatively new 
technique if compared to others that gained popularity during the last years. It is based on the 
structural risk minimization principle leading to the possibility to reach the global optimum. 
Neural Network tends to have overfitting issues with respect to SVM.  
 Support Vector Machines is a supervised-learning technique that is used for classification 
purposes; it is helpful to divide the data into classes based on their position in the space. The 
space is divided by a hyperplane which is multidimensional (here 2 dimensions are considered). 
The distance between the hyperplane and the nearest point on each side of the plane is the 
margin.  
The aim of SVM is to maximize the margins (also called support vectors), indeed bigger the 
margin, better the classification accuracy.  
It is not required that the original space is linearly separable; kernel functions are helpful to 









Figure 5 shows the hyperplane and the margins. The black thick line is the hyperplane which 
divides the plane into 2 (in our case failed and non-failed banks) and the dashed lines show the 
support vectors.  
In this specific case in which the hyperplane is in 2 dimensions, it is defined by the simple 
equation: 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 = 0 
 
Where 𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2 are parameters.  
One side of the plane is characterized by f(x)<0 and the other one f(x)>0. The magnitude 
indicates how far the observation is from the hyperplane; if f(x) is close to 0 the observation 
will be close to the plane causing more misclassification issues.  
 The figure also shows a grid composed by colored dotted points. This shows how the model 
is constructed; in particular in this case if an observation falls in the blue grid, the blue color 
will be assigned to it.  
As mentioned above, the aim is to maximize the distance between the hyperplane and the 
support vectors. This results in a maximization problem shown by James et al. (2013):  
 
maximize     M                         (1)  𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, . . . , 𝛽𝑝 , 𝑀 
  
subject to  ∑ 𝛽𝑗2𝑝𝑗=1                         (2) 
 𝑦𝑖(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖2+. . . +𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑝 ≥ 𝑀                  (3) 
 
Equation (3) is the constraints which ensures that all the observations are classified on the 
correct side of the hyperplane given that M is positive. Also equation (2) ensures that the 
observations are at the correct distance (at least M) from the hyperplane. 
The aim is to estimate the parameters  𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, . . . , 𝛽𝑝 that maximize the margin of the 
hyperplane.  
In cases in which the classes are not exactly separable the soft margins can be used and the 
maximal marginal classifier cannot be used; the support vector classifier has to be introduced 
which does not perform greatly when the data are non-linearly classified.  
 Support Vector Machines allows to convert a linear classifier into a classifier that allows to 
create non-linear decision boundaries automatically. One way to address for the non-linearity 
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is the enlargement of the feature space introducing quadratic, cubic or higher order functions 
of the predictors.  
As mentioned before, another way to take into account the nonlinearity is the enlargement of 
the feature space through the kernels. In particular, the classifier coming from the combination 
between a Support Vector Classifier and non-linear kernel, is called Support Vector Machine.  
 There exist different types of kernels; their primary goal is to understand how similar are 
two observations. Some of the most common kernels used for SVM purposes are the 




Source: (James, 2013) 
 
Figure 6 shows two examples of non-linearly separable data in which two different kernels 
have been applied. On the left example, a polynomial kernel with degree of 3 has been applied, 
whilst on the left the radial kernel has been chosen.  
 
Min and Lee (2005) applied the SVM technique in order to predict the bank failures. They 
chose the radial basis function as kernel function selecting all the necessary parameters (kernel 
and penalty parameters). They also applied a fully connected BPNN to the same sample of data; 
the study showed that both the methods reveal to be accurate in order to predict the failing 
institutions.  
 
Altinirmak, et al. (2016) defined the SVM as a good alternative for other techniques as the 
Neural Network, Random Forest, etc.  
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SVM shows a good performance when applied to real data; in particular, SVM outperforms NN 
showing a higher prediction accuracy and generating a reliable result.  
 
 Contrarily to the previous result, Ecer 2013 found that ANNs are more precise than SVM. 
In particular, the Type I and Type II error that result from the ANN method are smaller than 
the ones retrieved from SVM method.  
  
3.2.3 K-NN  
 
K-NN (k-Nearest Neighbors) is a supervised non-parametric technique which focuses on the 
historical data and identifies a number (K, a positive integer) of similar features which are called 
nearest neighbors. The prediction process comes from averaging the historical outcomes.  
It is instance-based meaning that it does not learn a model but memorizes the training elements 
which are then used for prediction purposes. 
With K-NN the classified data are taken (represented by a vector of features); a new data needs 
to be classified given its position in the space. The K-NN techniques consists in the 
measurement of the distance (usually Euclidean distance is chosen) between the new data that 
needs to be classified and the data which are already classified. Classification process requires 
to assign a label to data on the basis of the “majority voting”.  
 K-NN is a simple technique if compared to the ones previously mentioned but it is commonly 
used especially by the financial analyst since it is easy to implement and works even when the 
data are not linearly separable. K-NN is sensitive to outliers and it can cause over-fitting 
problems.  This creates a low bias but a high variance in the model. The over-fitting problem 
can be addressed by choosing the “K”:  
- A small K leads to estimates which are more flexible but this opportunity will result in 
over-fitting issues and leading to an estimation with a high variance.  
- A large K allows to have smoother decision boundaries and it creates estimates which 
are stable but not flexible (given the smoother boundary). The estimation will have less 
variance but higher bias (not accurate).  
 
This trade-off is shown in Figure 7. The thick black line is the decision boundary; as mentioned 
above, the choice of a higher K leads to a smoother boundary but it is less flexible and involves 
a higher bias. Using flexible methods allows to decrease the training error but the test error 





Source: (James, 2013) 
 
K-NN has been used as a predictive tool for the bank failure field; it is an easy method that can 
show a high degree of accuracy.  
 
Le and Viviani (2016) compared different methodologies. K-NN and ANN perform in a more 
effective way if compared to the statistical methods (Logit and LDA). The Early Warning 
Systems created using the Artificial Neural Network technique and the K-NN are able to detect 
and predict the most difficult cases.  
 
3.2.4 Random Forest  
 
Random Forest is a Machine Learning technique that can be used for either classification or 
regression purposes based on the so called “decision trees”. Random Forest average the basic 
decision tree model allowing for a forecast which is more reliable.  
A decision tree is composed by different elements which lend with a terminal node that contains 
the answer to the initial question on the basis of the characteristics of the variables that have 
been chosen.   
Figure 8 shows the most important elements of a decision tree. The root node is the initial 
question that begins the analysis, it is usually a “Yes” or “No” question. The root node and the 
decision ones are called “internal nodes” that splits into some attributes, the terminal nodes are 
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Source: author’s elaboration  
 
The decision trees are useful get some smaller set by splitting the subtrees. One of the most 
important decision that has to be taken while developing a decision tree consists in which 
feature to split; usually this choice is taken based on the entropy reduction (minimization of 
impure predictions) or on the information gain that come from the split.  
 One drawback of decision trees is the overfitting; in order to reduce this tendency, more 
decision trees can be aggregated. These trees are constructed in different ways and at the end 
the decisions are taking on the basis of the majority vote or on the weighted majority vote.  
Random forest implicates the use of different initial samples in order to build different tree; as 
bagging technique, it uses bootstrapping (sampling with replacement) to create decision trees. 
Whenever a split in the tree is computed, a random sample of predictors (taken from the full set 
 
ROOT NODE  














of predictors) is used as possible predictor.  At each split, a new sub-sample is taken; the number 
of predictors that is taken into account is usually the square root of the total predictors. This 
decision is usually taken to avoid the effects of a strong predictors on the final result and also 
allows the trees to be uncorrelated to each other.   
  
Random Forest technique have also been used as classification method to predict bank failures.  
Petropoulos et al. (2017) investigated the predictive power of Random Forest finding that this 
method has a higher predictive power if compared to Logit and Linear Discriminant Analysis 
but also if compared to Support Vector Machines and Neural Networks. The authors underline 
the positive aspects that characterize Random Forest: it is able to work with large datasets, it 
does not have correlation restrictions, efficiently handle the outliers.  
 
The statistical and machine learning techniques that are useful for the prediction of bank and 
corporate failure. In the next chapter, some of these methodologies will be implemented in order 































4.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 Finding a model that accurately predicts the failure of the banks is the aim of this analysis. 
The classification problem (default/no default) starts with the identification of the methodology 
that predicts in the most accurate way the banks’ default based on the observation of different 
financial ratios, in particular comparing statistical and machine learning techniques.   
 The best model is then used to evaluate how the accuracy of the prediction varies with time; 
indeed, there will be analyzed data retrieved for 8 quarters prior to the failure.  
 Section 4.1 is focused on the description of the data: how the sample of banks has been 
chosen, what are the ratios utilized for the analysis, etc. 
Section 4.2 is focused on the methodology: how multicollinearity has been addressed, how the 
most relevant variables have been effectively chosen, and how the models have been 
implemented.  




This section provides an overview of the data which have been used to implement the models. 
Paragraph 4.1.1 focuses on the selection of the sample of banks which has been selected to 
conduct the analysis. In paragraph 4.1.2 the list of the ratios initially chosen is described.  
 
4.1.1 Selection of the Banks  
 
The selection of the banks that are used to build the model is based on both the asset size and 
the geographic position (whenever possible).  
 A total of 50 large banks with the asset size bigger than $ 500 million have been chosen for 
the empirical analysis; the time period analyzed goes from 2005 to 2015; the choice has been 
made to have a complete view about the situation of the banks pre and post financial crisis.  
 The list of the failed banks has been retrieved from the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation) database. FDIC is an independent agency founded by Congress in 1933, its main 
aim is to insure deposits (up to $250,000 per depositor) and to supervise institutions in order to 









Figure 9 shows the importance of the existence of FDIC; more than 5,000 institutions are 
insured (as of 7/16/2020) with value of deposits which is more than $15 million.  
 Between these 5,068 active institutions, 25 of them have been selected in order for them to 
match with the 25 failed banks previously chosen. The active banks have been selected on the 
basis of their asset size: looking at the asset size of the failed bank in the default quarter, the 
banks active have been matched accordingly. The data have been retrieved for 8 quarter (1st 
quarter in which the institutions defaulted and the previous 7 quarters) in order to obtain 
accurate data. This matching procedure has been improved (whenever possible) by selecting 






Figure 10 shows the number of FDIC insured banks that failed between 2000 and 2020 and the 
Total Assets in million dollars. One of the fundamental requirements that is needed for the 
analysis to be conducted is the regulatory framework: the institutions must be comply with the 
same requirements.  
 
4.1.2 Selection of the ratios  
 
After the selection of the banks that will be analyzed, it is important to choose the ratios on 
which the analysis will based. In the previous chapter the importance of the selection of the 
ratio has been explained: some financial ratios better identify the problematic banks than others. 
The different methodologies defined in Chapter 2 explain why the ratios are fundamental to 
detect banks that are not sound and which are the to be taken into account in order to get more 
accurate models.  
 For the purposes of this empirical analysis the studies conducted by Altman (1968), Le et al. 
(2018), Kumar Ravi et al. (2007), Beaver (1968), Sinkey (1975) have been analyzed to 
understand which ratios allows to predict the failure of the banks in a more accurate way.  
 The financial ratios can be grouped into 5 categories: Capital, Asset Quality, Management, 
Earnings, Liquidity (CAMEL) ratios. All the 19 ratios initially selected are listed hereafter:  
 
- Equity/Total Assets (C): it indicates the quantity of the assets of the bank that has been 
generated through equity (hence owned by the shareholders). It can also be seen as the 
quantity of assets which is not held by the debtholders: the higher the ratio, the less the 
company is leveraged. Therefore, in case of liquidation of the bank, the ratio is useful 
to understand how much the shareholders are going to receive. 
 
- Debt/Equity (C): it is useful in order to analyze the financial leverage of the banks. A 
high Debt/Equity ratio highlights that the bank is financing its operating side through 
debt. It is a useful tool to analyze the capital structure of the bank.  
 
- Tier 1 Risk based capital ratio (C): Tier 1 Risk Based Capital Ratio is one fundamental 
indicator required by the Basel international Capital Standards after the 2008 financial 
crisis. This ratio is important to understand how the lack of capital was fundamental to 
absorb the losses and remain active and liquid. Many banks analyzed have a low Tier 1 
Risk Based Capital Ratio, underlying the importance to have sufficient capital to avoid 
insolvency. The ratio is computed as Tier 1 Capital to Risk Weighted Assets. RWA 
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(Risk Weighted Assets) are the bank’s assets to which a weight is assigned on the basis 
of their level of risk.  
 
- Total Risk based capital ratio (C): it is computed as the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital 
divided by RWA. Tier 1 Capital is composed by the shareholders’ equity and the 
retained earnings whilst, the Tier 2 Capital is the “supplementary capital” (such as the 
reserves, etc.) and it is less secure than Tier 1 Capital. It is another instrument that allows 
to make a prediction with a higher rate of accuracy.  
 
- Earning Assets/Total Assets (A): this ratio helps to understand which is the amount of 
assets which is helping the bank to generate earnings. The Earning Assets can be 
described as the ones which are able to generate wealth for the bank (including bonds, 
real estate properties, license, etc.). These earning assets are important because they 
allow the bank to get additional sources of income which does not come from the main 
operations.  
 
- Loan and Lease Loss Allowance/Loans and Leases (A): the allowances for Loan and 
Lease Losses is a reserve that allows to take into account the possibility for the banks 
to face issues of bad debts or of collecting back the amount. The Allowance reduces the 
book values of the loans and leases in order for them to be consistent with the total 
amount that the bank is expecting to collect.  
 
- Loan and Lease Loss Allowance/Noncurrent Loan and Leases (A): it is important to 
understand what is the percentage of allowance dedicated to the Noncurrent Loans and 
Leases: Loans and Leases 90 days past due or in nonaccrual status.  
 
- Pretax ROA (A): is computed as the pretax net income divided by the average total 
assets. It allows to understand if the bank is able to allocate and manage the reserves 
resources.  
 
- NOI/Total Assets (M): management ability is not always easy to quantify; some ratios 
can be used to evaluate it. One of them is the Net Operating Income to Total Assets 
ratio. NOI is useful to evaluate if the income generating investments are profitable.  
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- Efficiency Ratio (M): this ratio is computed as the noninterest expenses less 
amortization of intangible assets as percent of net interest income plus noninterest 
income. It allows to measure the amount of net operating revenues that are absorbed by 
the expenses. The lower the value of the ratio, the higher the ability of the bank to use 
its assets to generate more income.  
 
- Cash Dividends/NI (M): is the amount of cash dividend paid to the shareholders as 
percentage of the net income. It shows how much the bank is returning to the 
shareholders as dividends compared to how much it could instead retain to add either 
cash or reserves or to reinvest. The ratio can also be useful to assess if the dividend 
policy is sustainable with respect to the financial situation of the bank.  
 
- Retained Earnings/Average Equity (M): it is a measure of the quantity of retained 
earnings the bank is keeping if compared to the average equity. This ratio is important 
to understand how much the bank is keeping to reinvest and how much is instead paying 
out. A high ratio can be either a good or bad indicator: there are situations in which the 
bank retains more earnings than what is effectively needed. 
 
- Noninterest income/Total Assets (E): Noninterest income can be defined as the income 
coming from activities that are not part of the core operations of the bank. It can be 
defined as “fee income” as the fees represent the majority of the noninterest income for 
a bank. When the interest rates are low, the banks may rely on noninterest income to 
stay active.   
 
- NIM (E): it is a useful tool to analyze how much the bank is earning from the interests 
on the loans they made compared to the amount it has to pay as interest on deposits. It 
can be used as a reliable indicator on how much the bank is profitable and how much it 
is growing.  
 
- ROA (E): it is one of the most common ratios used to evaluate the profitability of a 
bank. Indeed, it allows to evaluate how profitable a bank is compared to the total amount 
of assets owned. Thanks to this ratio, many evaluations on the bank can be conducted; 
it helps to understand if the institution is converting the money invested into income.  
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- ROE (E): a common measure of the bank’s financial performance is the Return on 
Equity. It is computed by dividing the Net Income by the Equity; it can measure the 
ability of the management to use assets to create profits. 
 
- Net Loans and Leases/Total Assets (L):  Net Loans and Leases are computed as the 
Total Loans and Leases minus the Allowance for Loans and Leases Losses. This ratio 
shows what is the percentage of Loans and Leases issued by a bank with respect to the 
Total Assets. A high ratio might be a signal of scarce resources for the bank to survive 
to liquidity crises.  
 
- Net Loans and Leases/Total Deposits (L): it is another ratio to check if the bank is 
currently liquid. A too high ratio might cause liquidity issues for the bank but a too low 
ratio might be a signal that the bank is not earning as much as it could effectively do. 
 
- Domestic Deposits/Total Assets (L): it shows the percentage of the domestic deposits 
with respect to the Total Assets. Domestic Deposits are considered important because 
they are a cheap and reliable source of funds. A higher level of deposits helps the banks 
to be more stable and to be solvent.  
 
All the data needed to compute the ratios have been retrieved from the Call Reports reported 




In this section, the methodologies used are explained. As aforementioned, the aim is to 
implement different models (statistical and machine learning) in order to identify the most 
accurate. This model is subsequently used to evaluate how accuracy varies as time increases (8 
quarters). The software used for all the computation is Python.  
 
Significance of the Predictors  
 
As seen in the previous section, the ratios which were considered at the beginning are 19. Once 
all the data have been retrieved, before the implementation of the models, it is important to 
identify which are the relevant variables for all the time periods taken into account.  
 In particular, t-tests have been conducted for this purpose for all the 8 quarters analyzed.      
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t-test compares the means of the two groups and allows to understand if the differences between 
them are statistically significant. A large t score indicates a wider difference between the 
groups. The hypotheses to be tested are:  
 
H0: There is no difference between the means of the two groups 
 
H1: The means between the two groups are significantly different 
 
A 10% significance level has been used to conduct the test. The results for the first quarter 
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Source: author’s elaboration  
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After analyzing the results of the t-test, some variables are dropped. These variables are: ROE, 
Retained Earnings/Average Equity, and Net Loans/Total Deposits; the other 15 ratios are used 
to implement the models.  
 
Multicollinearity 
Another element that may be an issue for the implementation of some methods is the 
multicollinearity which is a situation in which two or more predictors are highly (but not 
perfectly) correlated in a regression model. In fact, it can cause problems in the calculation of 
the predictors.  
 All the ratios that have been initially selected show, analyzing the literature, a great 
predictive power. It is important to understand if all of them can be used for the classification 
problem or if some deeper analysis has to be done.  
 Multicollinearity can cause big changes in the coefficients estimation when there are small 
changes in the data analyzed but it does not decrease the overall predictive power of the model 
implemented. In order to get coefficients’ values which can be used for the analysis, 
multicollinearity has to be eliminated.  
The correlation matrix (Appendix 4) computed for the statistically different variables shows 
that some variables are highly correlated between each other.  
Some models (in particular Logit and LDA) are highly sensitive to multicollinearity.  
Variance Inflation Factor measures the correlation of the explanatory variables in a regression 
model. In order to compute the VIF, a linear regression has been implemented since R2 measure 
is needed. As previously mentioned, this is an analysis that will help to understand if 
multicollinearity exists for the set of predictors chosen but it is not going to impact the whole 
predictive power of the model.  
The Variance Inflation Factor allows to detect the multicollinearity and it is an indicator of 
how much the variance of a predictor is inflated (in percentage). VIF is computed as:  
 𝑉𝐼𝐹 = 11 − 𝑅2 
 
Where R2 measures how close the data are to the fitted regression.  
A high VIF value (more than 5) highlights a multicollinearity issue. Figure 12 shows VIF 







Source: author’s elaboration  
 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
Principal Component Analysis is a dimension reduction technique that helps to focus on the 
most important predictors.  
PCA starts with the computation of the correlation matrix and then the calculation of the 
eigenvalues and eigenvectors; the first principal component is given by the eigenvector 
associated with the largest eigenvalue (in general, the larger the eigenvalue, the higher is its 
contribution to the behavior of the data).  
 This analysis allows to perform a linear transformation of the original data: the first principal 
component (as a linear combination of original variables) explains the highest percentage of the 
variance. The important variables (as components) are extracted with the aim of explaining as 
much variance as possible, eliminating the problem of collinear variables. Indeed, all the 
correlated variables are included in the same Principal Component.   
 The following principal components are both uncorrelated between each other and from the 
first principal component and they capture the remaining variance of the model.  
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 In addition to the creation of uncorrelated components, PCA is frequently used in order to 




Source: author’s elaboration  
 
For the purposes of the analysis, 5 Principal Components have been chosen. Figure 13 
graphically shows the individual and the cumulative percentage of variance explained by the 
components. In particular, the first Principal Component explains 48.68% of the variance, 
followed by the second PC (25.58%), the third (10.93%), the fourth (7.20%), and the fifth 
(3.36%). The total variance explained by the five Principal Components is 95.75%.  
 
Analysis of the models  
 
In order to analyze the different methods, the data for the defaulted banks and for the active 
banks have been randomly shuffled; the data are standardized and then the whole sample has 
been divided into training (25% of data) and test set (75% data). The training set is used to fit 
the model whilst the test set is used to evaluate how the model implemented fits on the training 
data. Python programming language has been used for the computations.  
 
Different measures have been used to compare the prediction power of the models:  
- Accuracy: Python’s accuracy_score function allows to compute the accuracy of the 
model, an accuracy of 100% indicates that the model is able to fully predict the failures.  
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- Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC): it is a common 
measure of prediction power of the models. ROC can be defined as a probability curve, 
whilst the AUC shows the performance of the classifier (quantifies the ability of the 
model of distinguish and separating between classes). A high AUC value indicates a 
better predictive power, in particular, an AUC value of 1 indicates a perfect prediction. 
The ROC curve is plotted as True Positive Rate (y-axis) against False Positive Rate (x-
axis), it hence shows how the model is able to classify the input data.  
- Gini coefficient: it can be a measure of the performance of a classifier. It gives an idea 
on the accuracy of the model. Its value ranges from 0 to 1: 0 is assigned to models which 
are not able to predict the outcome at all, whilst 1 is assigned to models which can 
perfectly predict the outcome.  
 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 2(𝐴𝑈𝐶) − 1 
 
Additionally, a confusion matrix is computed to understand which are the Type I and Type II 
error.  
 
4.3 Empirical Results  
 
In this section, the results from the empirical analysis are presented. The confusion matrices 
and the accuracy levels will be shown for every implemented model; a comparison between the 
different methodologies will highlight which is the most accurate model (given the banks and 
ratio that have been chosen) that will be used to analyze how accuracy moves as the time from 
default increases (up to 8 quarters prior to the failure). All the methods that have been used are 
supervised. The problem presented (predict the defaulted and sound banks) is a classification 
issue; the output for all the methodologies is binary: 0 for banks that the model predicts to be 
defaulted and 1 for the sound banks.  
 
4.3.1 Statistical Methods  
 
Logistic Regression 
Logistic Regression (or logit) model can be used for classification purposes. It is a useful tool 
to forecast the probability of an event by looking at the data in the past. As previously 
mentioned, the output that this model gives is binary (0 or 1). The linear relationship between 







Backpropagation Neural Network  
 
Backpropagation Neural Network (B-NN) is a supervised machine learning technique inspired 
to the human system of neurons. The B-NN in particular refines the error by sending it back to 
the previous layers and learning from this mechanism. In order to implementing a B-NN 
algorithm, the network has to be initialized and the weights and bias that are associated to the 
initial layer are decided. The neurons have to be activated through the input data, the weights 
and the bias previously selected. In order to get a first output from the algorithm, an activation 
function (sigmoid in this case) is used; the information is then forward propagated. The error 
for each output (0 or 1) neuron is then computed and backpropagated, the weights are updated 
and the network is trained. Once the algorithm is trained, the prediction can be done.  
 The prediction accuracy for the sample that has been chosen is 92%.  
 
Random Forest shows to have the highest prediction accuracy if compared to the other model 
that have been implemented. 
 Logistic Regression is the model which shows the lowest Type II error (0%). This means 
that the model correctly classifies the banks which are not defaulting. Indeed, a positive Type I 
error highlights that the model classifies some banks which are defaulted as sound banks; this 
type of error is costly. The other models analyzed have a higher Type II error but a really low 
Type I error (the most concerning one). This is the reason why, even if logit shows the lowest 
Type II error, it is not used to conduct further analyses.  
 
4.3.3 Changes of accuracy over time  
 
As it has been previously shown, Random Forest is the technique which has the highest 
accuracy for the prediction of the bank failures. The aim of this section is to apply the RF 
technique to the 8 quarters prior to the failure. As previously mentioned, the t-test for all the 
quarter was computed to define the predictors that are going to be used; all the prediction 
variables are standardized, the correlation matrices have been computed. The accuracy 
measures previously mentioned have been used to evaluate the model.      
     
For the 2nd quarter prior to failure the Type II error is higher if compared to the first quarter 
(15%) whilst the Type I error is 0%. The accuracy is 84.62%, the AUC is 0.89 and the Gini 
Coefficient is 0.78.  
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For the 3rd quarter prior to failure the Type I error is 7.7% and Type II error is 15.39%. The 
accuracy is 76.91%, the AUC is 0.78 and the Gini Coefficient is 0.55.  
 
For the 4th quarter prior to failure the Type I error is 0% whilst the Type II error increased to 
23.01%. The accuracy is 76.92% AUC is 0.75 and the Gini Coefficient is 0.50.  
 
For the 5th quarter prior to failure both the Type I and Type II error are 15.38%, the accuracy 
is 69.23%, the AUC is 0.68 and the Gini Coefficient is 0.35.  
 
For the 6th quarter prior to failure the Type I error is 46.15% and the Type II error is 0%. The 
accuracy is 53.85%, the AUC is 0.63, and the Gini Coefficient is 0.25.  
 
For the 7th quarter prior to failure the Type I error is 0% and the Type II error is 53.84%. The 
accuracy is 46.15%, the AUC is 0.61, and the Gini Coefficient is 0.22.  
 
For the 8th quarter prior to failure the Type I error is 23.08% whilst the Type II error is 





Source: author’s elaboration 
 
As it can be seen in Figure 19, all the accuracy and prediction power measures that have been 
used show a decreasing trend as the time from the default increases. The model is reliable up 
to 4-5 quarters prior to failure.  
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 This analysis shows that, given an initial sample of 25 randomly chosen defaulted banks 
matched by asset size with banks still active (as March 2020), the different methodologies 
implemented have different degree of accuracy. In particular, confronting different accuracy 
measures, some models result to be less efficient in predicting the bank failure.  
 Overall, Random Forest is more accurate than the statistical methods implemented (logit and 
LDA) and of other machine learning techniques (k-NN, SVM, and B-NN) whilst, the least 
accurate model is LDA.  































The failure of a bank creates concern since its effects reflects on the whole economy and on the 
other financial institutions through the so called “contagion effect”. There exist many causes 
that lead a commercial bank to fail; they can both be internal to the bank or they can come from 
an external source.  
The impossibility for the U.S. regulator to continuously supervise the institutions through 
the on-site examinations lead to the need to find an alternative way to verify the status of the 
institutions. 
Many Early Warning Systems have been created by the government, mainly implemented 
through statistical techniques and taking the main information from the bank’s financial 
statements.  
 The purpose of this thesis was to build off-site models using both statistical and machine 
learning techniques and to understand which one had the highest predictive power; the whole 
process was based on finding the best classification technique. In particular, 50 large (more 
than $ 500 million assets) U.S. commercial bank have been analyzed: 25 failed banks between 
2005 and 2015 have been matched with 25 still active banks based on the asset size at the time 
of the default and on the location whenever possible. All the institutions have been randomly 
selected from the FDIC database (hence only including insured banks).  
Initially, 19 financial ratios have been retrieved for 8 quarters prior to the failure. Literature 
regarding the prediction of bank failure have been analyzed and all the model used have been 
explained in order to select the most useful ratios.  
Student’s t-tests for all the 8 quarters have been implemented to eliminate the predictors that 
didn’t show statistically different means between groups. For the first quarter 15 ratios were 
used to conduct the analyses.  
Logistic Regression and Linear Discriminant Analysis were the two statistical technique 
implemented, whilst K-Nearest Neighbors, Supported Vector Machines, Random Forest, and 
Backpropagation Neural Network have been implemented as machine learning techniques.  
 These 6 approaches are studied for the first quarter prior to failure of the institutions; in order 
to evaluate and compare them, accuracy, AUC, and Gini coefficient have been computed for 
each model. Confusion matrices have also been showed to compare Type I and Type II errors 
for each classification technique.  
The implementation of each method had different requirements; statistical techniques need 
the predictors to be linear, normal, and independent. Multicollinearity revealed to be one of the 
biggest issues for the correct estimation of the parameters (as shown by the VIF). Therefore, a 
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Principal Component Analysis have been implemented before the Logit and LDA models. 5 
uncorrelated Principal Components explaining 95.75% of the total variance have been used to 
implement the statistical models.  
Machine learning techniques implemented don’t have the same requirement for the 
predictors as the ones discussed for the statistical models; nevertheless, the main issue to 
address is the variance-bias tradeoff: models with low bias in the estimation of the parameter 
tend to have high variance.  
For example, the k-NN model shows a high variance when the number of Nearest Neighbors 
(k) is small. Balancing the variance and bias is extremely important to achieve a good 
classification model that could accurately predict the default of the banks. Random Forest is a 
methodology that puts together different decision trees and which is able to decrease the 
variance without increasing the bias as described in Chapter 4.  
 The results for the first quarter prior to failure show that Random Forest shows higher value 
for accuracy, Gini Coefficient, and AUC resulting as the model with the highest predictive 
power. Logit shows the lowest Accuracy score but it presents the lowest Type II error (and the 
highest Type I error). LDA and SVM are better than Logit model (especially comparing the 
Type I errors) whilst k-NN shows the lowest Gini Coefficient.  
  Random Forest shows the best predictive power if compared to the other models 
implemented, meaning that for the first quarter prior to the failure RF is able to correctly classify 
92.3% of the banks (with a Type II error of 7.3%).  
 The predictive power of the model has been analyzed for all the 8 quarters prior to failure: 
as expected, it decreases as the time from the failure increases. Type I and Type II errors 
increase too, leading to less reliable results.  
This result highlights how difficult is to predict the failures when the analysis is done 2 years 
prior to the failure (8th quarter); indeed, the accuracy is less than 35% and probability of 
misclassifying a default bank is 23.07% (Type I error).  
 Overall, all the models presented have a good predictive power for the first quarter prior to 
the failure without showing big differences between statistical and machine learning techniques 
(especially comparing the accuracy), highlighting that efficient Early Warning Systems can be 
created to predict the defaulting banks.   
Nevertheless, the simple mechanism of the  Random Forest showed a slightly higher 
accuracy than more complex models such as Back-Propagation Neural Network.  
The creation of an accurate Early Warning System is a really important task for the regulators 
and the investors. For the former it can help to understand when to add requirements and reduce 
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the overall cost associated to default; for the latter it allows to identify the sound banks and to 
be aware of the risk they are taking.  
 Deeper researches can be conducted using ensembled techniques; combining different 
machine learning techniques; this would allow to reduce the bias-variance tradeoff and create 
even more accurate models. Additionally, other information can be used to increase the 
predictive power of the presented models such as macroeconomic factors.  
Moreover, it would also be useful to analyze the power of unsupervised techniques as 
Clustering (k-means and hierarchical clustering). Unsupervised machine learning algorithms 
are used for data which are not already labeled; they are complex to implement and can be less 



























APPENDIX 1: List of Institutions  
 
DEFAULTED BANKS ACTIVE BANKS 




COUNTY BANK  09/04/2009 
SOLUTIONSBANK SOUTHERN BANK 12/11/2009 
THE FIRST STATE BANK 
THE CORTLAND 
SAVINGS AND 
BANKING COMPANY 01/20/2012 
THE PARK AVENUE BANK 
NEWFIELD 




COMMUNITY BANK 06/11/2010 
SECURITY PACIFIC BANK 
BANKERS' BANK OF 
THE WEST 11/07/2008 








THE FARMERS & 
MERCHANTS BANK 07/31/2009 
PENINSULA BANK 1ST SUMMIT BANK 06/25/2010 
BANK OF FLORIDA - 
SOUTHWEST 
THE FIRST NATIONAL 
BANK OF 
PALMERTON  05/28/2010 
 
DARBY BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY 
FIRST UNITED 
SECURITY BANK 11/12/2010 
TEAMBANK, N.A. SEATTLE BANK 03/20/2009 
BARNES BANKING 
COMPANY 







THE COLUMBIAN BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY 




BANK CITIZENS 1ST BANK  05/20/2011 
SAN DIEGO NATIONAL 
BANK HANCOCK BANK  10/30/2009 
DORAL BANK FIRST BANK  02/27/2015 
CALIFORNIA NATIONAL 




SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF 
CLEVELAND 11/06/2009 
IMPERIAL CAPITAL BANK 
FARMERS AND 
MERCHANTS BANK 
OF LONG BEACH 12/18/2009 
PARK NATIONAL BANK 
PLAINSCAPITAL 
BANK  10/30/2009 
AMTRUST BANK  BANKUNITED  12/04/2009 
DOWNEY SAVINGS AND 











APPENDIX 2: Student’s t-tests  
The results for the t-tests from the 2nd to the 8th quarters prior to the failure are hereafter 
presented as Python outputs. The variables which don’t show a statistically different mean 
between the two groups are dropped to improve the quality of the predictive power.  























Results for the t-test 7 quarters prior to the failure  
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Results for the t-test 8 quarters prior to the failure  
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APPENDIX  3: ROC and AUC  
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) graph allows to efficiently visualize the classifier in 
order to compare it with others based on its performance. ROC is a two-dimensional graph: on 
the X-axis the False Positive Rate is plotted whilst on the Y-axis the True Positive Rate is 
showed. This graph is a useful tool for evaluating a model on the basis of the True Positives 
and False Positives it is able to detect. ROC can be also defined as a probability curve (Fawcett, 
2006).  
 
False Positive rate is given by:  
 𝐹𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠  
 
True Positive rate is given by:  
 𝑇𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 
 
Accuracy rate is given by:  
 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 
 
Precision is given by:  
 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 
 
AUC (Area Under ROC Curve) permits to recognize if the model is a good classifier. The 
correct prediction of the bank failures is a supervised classification problem; AUC defines if a 
technique is able to separate between defaulted and sound banks.  
In particular, AUC value goes from 0 to 1. An AUC value of 1 indicates a classifier that 
perfectly discriminates between the two classes, meanwhile an AUC value of 0 indicates that 
the classifier isn’t able to separate between classes. Therefore, the higher the AUC, the better 
is the predictive power of the model.  
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Logistic Regression ROC 
 
Linear Discriminant Analysis ROC 
 
Support Vector Machines ROC 
 
k-Nearest Neighbors ROC 
 
Random Forest ROC 
t 
 94 
AUC values and the ROC curves shows that the model which better separates between the 
groups is Random Forest with an AUC of 0.94. The model that is good to discriminate between 
failed and non-failed institutions is k-Nearest Neighbors.  
 
The ROC graphs and the AUC values for the Random Forest model implemented with the data 

















Random Forest ROC (2nd quarter prior to the failure)  
t 
Random Forest ROC (3rd quarter prior to the failure)  
t 
Random Forest ROC (4th quarter prior to the failure)  
t 










Source: author’s elaboration  
 
AUC values of Random Forest decrease when the oldest quarters are analyzed. In particular, 











Random Forest ROC (8th quarter prior to the failure)  
t 
Random Forest ROC (6th quarter prior to the failure)  
t 
Random Forest ROC (7th quarter prior to the failure)  
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